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INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE LAW OF
OVERSIGHT INDEPENDENCE
Andrew C. Brunsden*

ABSTRACT
President Trump’s defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions
of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative
independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions
that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability.
This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal
watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President’s attacks on the institution.
President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or
replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in
some cases, he named political appointees as acting IGs, despite clear conflicts of
interest. This Article analyzes the constitutionality and policy implications of recent
congressional proposals that seek to reinforce IG independence and prevent future
abuses of power by codifying norms into law: specifically, proposals to limit the
President’s appointment and removal authority, including statutory removal for cause
protection and restrictions on acting appointments. Recently, in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court narrowed the grounds for
congressional removal protection. However, this Article argues that a constitutional
basis exists in the Court’s reframed doctrine for Congress to enact IG removal protection because the President and agency heads are ultimately accountable for acting
upon IGs’ investigative findings and recommendations. The Article also considers
structural changes to the IG institution—a multimember commission, court-appointed
officers, or agency appointees—as alternative forms of protection and applies removal protection to particular cases to evaluate whether it supplies the proper
balance between IG independence and accountability. The Article then explains the
validity of proposed restrictions on acting IG appointments and offers additional policy
recommendations to enhance statutory qualifications for permanent IG appointments.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School; Counsel to the Commissioner and
Inspector General, New York City Department of Investigation. Thank you to Dean Anthony
Crowell of New York Law School for his encouragement, feedback, and support. Thank you
also to Rebecca Roiphe and faculty of New York Law School who joined the workshop on this
Article, and to participants in the American University Washington College of Law Oversight
and Accountability Symposium, including Fernando LaGuarda and Emilia DiSanto, for their
comments. Finally, thanks to Lauren Kropiewnicki for research assistance. The views in this
Article are the author’s own.
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The law of oversight independence reveals the interplay between internal constraints
on executive power, the external separation of powers, and the dynamics of presidential
accountability in the design of reforms to protect oversight institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Donald Trump’s defiance of basic democratic norms threatened the oversight
institutions of American democracy.1 One of his primary targets was the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement.2 Flagrant attacks on
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)3 met
1

See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Toward Restoring Rule-of-Law Norms, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1205,
1207–08 (2018).
2
See Daphna Rehna, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2207–08
(2018) (“Although many understand law enforcement to be a paradigmatic executive function, there is today a set of structural norms that insulate some types of prosecutorial and
investigative decisionmaking from the President.” (footnote omitted)).
3
See, e.g., Eileen Sullivan, Trump Takes up Call to Barr to ‘Clean House’ at Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/us/politics/trump-barr-jus
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widespread condemnation for their disrespect to the rule of law.4 Yet while the
prominent refusal to follow norms of prosecutorial and investigative independence was
well documented,5 the wider assault on oversight independence received significantly less attention. Oversight independence extends beyond criminal law enforcement
agencies to institutions that monitor a range of government activity for potential
misconduct and deficiencies; it is defined by the commitment to objective review,
fact-finding, and reporting based on a sufficient degree of freedom from outside
interference or political pressure.6 Significantly, President Trump’s violation of oversight independence norms embroiled Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, when he fired two IGs and replaced three acting IGs
for their legitimate oversight activities.7 This subversion of independence threatened
the values of integrity, transparency, and accountability served by IG oversight.
tice-department.html [https://perma.cc/GNR5-WKBZ] (reporting on the President’s tweet
calling on the Attorney General to “clean house” after criticizing line prosecutors’ sentencing
recommendation in the Roger Stone case); David Shortell, Evan Perez & Josh Campbell, FBI
Agents Warn of ‘Chilling Effect’ from Trump and Barr Attacks, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 12, 2019,
8:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/12/politics/fbi-chilling-effect-trump-barr-attacks
/index.html [https://perma.cc/824J-2J8C] (noting the President and Attorney General’s critiques
of the FBI after reports of deficiencies in their surveillance applications); see also Donald
Trump (@DonaldTrump), Trump Twitter Archive, https://www.thetrumparchive.com [https://
perma.cc/38C4-A3C5] (tracking 372 uses of the term “witch hunt” in tweets and retweets
by President Trump from May 2017 to August 2020, most directed at Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s Russia investigation).
4
See, e.g., DOJ Alumni Statement on the Flynn Case, MEDIUM (May 12, 2020), https://
medium.com/@dojalumni/doj-alumni-statement-on-flynn-case-7c38a9a945b9 [https://perma.cc
/E4VT-VP53] (signed by nearly 2,000 former DOJ prosecutors and officials calling for the
court to reject DOJ’s unprecedented motion to dismiss the Michael Flynn indictment due to
“Attorney General Barr’s repeated actions to use the Department as a tool to further President
Trump’s personal and political interests”); DOJ Alumni Statement on the Events Surrounding
the Sentencing of Roger Stone, MEDIUM (Feb. 16, 2020), https://medium.com/@dojalumni/doj
-alumni-statement-on-the-events-surrounding-the-sentencing-of-roger-stone-c2cb75ae4937
[https://perma.cc/H4P5-Z7DQ] (signed by over 2,500 former DOJ prosecutors and officials condemning the President and Attorney General’s intervention in the Roger Stone sentencing because they “openly and repeatedly flouted th[e] fundamental principle” of “equal justice under
the law” and acted contrary to DOJ policies requiring independent prosecutorial decisions).
5
See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927, 1932–42 (2020); Todd David Peterson, Federal Prosecutorial
Independence, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 220–23, 283–85 (2020); Rebecca
Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L.
REV. 1077, 1078–81 (2020).
6
See Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General
Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2032–33 (1998) (discussing the need for independence to conduct
legitimate investigations and protect against politicization).
7
See, e.g., Melissa Quinn, The Internal Watchdogs Trump Has Fired or Replaced, CBS
NEWS (May 19, 2020, 11:43 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-inspectors-gen
eral-internal-watchdogs-fired-list/ [https://perma.cc/UC9G-NTDY] (summarizing the President’s
termination of IGs and replacement of acting IGs).

4

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1

The end of the Trump presidency is an opportunity to assess and repair the
damage done to our democratic institutions by presidential abuses of power. 8 This
Article takes stock of the erosion of oversight independence norms in the case of IGs
and examines changes in the law that could better protect IG independence. Since
the removal and replacement of IGs, Congress has offered several bills to rein in the
President’s removal and appointment authority.9 In addition, a number of opinion
pieces by advocates and scholars have suggested proposals to address gaps in the
law revealed by President Trump’s disregard for IG independence.10 This Article seeks
to expand and deepen exploration of these proposals. First, it conceptualizes independence as a product of law and norms that shape IGs’ role as an institutional
constraint on executive power. Scholarship on the “internal separation of powers” has
noted that IGs serve as a check on the presidency from within the Executive Branch,11
but few have focused in depth on IGs’ key oversight role,12 and legal scholarship has
8

See, e.g., BOB BAUER & JACK GOLDSMITH, AFTER TRUMP: RECONSTRUCTING THE
PRESIDENCY 7 (2020) (“[T]he case for reform is straightforward. Trump has shown that the
current array of laws and norms governing the presidency is inadequate to protect institutions
vital to the American constitutional democracy and to ensure that the president is, and appears
to be, constrained by law.”).
9
See generally CONG. RES. SERV., LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATED TO THE REMOVAL
OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 1–3 (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11698.pdf (summarizing the proposal fifteen separate bills between
the House and Senate during 2020).
10
See Andrew Brunsden, When Should the President Be Able to Fire a Watchdog?, THE
HILL (July 5, 2021), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/561560-when-should
-the-president-be-able-to-fire-a-watchdog [https://perma.cc/GAY8-EZUV]; Danielle Brian
& Liz Hempowicz, Good Governance Paper No. 11: Strengthening Inspectors General, JUST
SEC. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73075/good-governance-paper-no-11
-strengthening-inspectors-general/ [https://perma.cc/PG62-223G]; Andrew Brunsden, How
to Protect Inspectors General, THE HILL (Sept. 28, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/judici
ary/518635-how-to-protect-inspectors-general [https://perma.cc/Z8EA-8D9A]; Aziz Huq,
Trump Loves to Fire His Watchdogs. The Supreme Court Just Made it Easier., WASH. POST
(July 1, 2020, 9:27 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/inspectors
-general-cfpb-executive-power-supreme-court/; Jack Goldsmith, A Constitutional Response
to Trump’s Firings of Inspectors General, LAWFARE (June 10, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://www
.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-response-trumps-firings-inspectors-general [https://perma
.cc/T4VH-DQK2]; Jack Goldsmith & Ben Miller-Gootnick, Legal Issues Implicated by
Trump’s Firing of the State Department Inspector General, LAWFARE (May 18, 2020, 9:27
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-issues-implicated-trumps-firing-state-department
-inspector-general [https://perma.cc/QK5T-XX5D]; Donald K. Sherman, Congress Should Take
Steps to Protect the Independence of Inspectors General, JUST SEC. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/69707/congress-should-take-steps-to-protect-the-independence
-of-inspectors-general/ [https://perma.cc/5K8R-3ZZM].
11
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and
External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE
L.J. 2314, 2347–48 (2006).
12
But see Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National
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not meaningfully addressed the dimensions of oversight independence as a core
feature of the institution. Second, by engaging more fully with constitutional and
policy questions related to IG independence and its safeguards, the Article addresses
overlooked or underappreciated considerations at the intersection of the internal and
external separation of powers, which are relevant to the design of reforms. Further,
rigorous IG oversight during the Trump administration often challenged administration positions on law enforcement, immigration, public health, science, and treatment of the civil service, among other areas.13 The President’s politically motivated
firings and replacements were a clear expression of animus to such oversight. It is,
therefore, crucial to articulate the nature of IG independence, to catalogue the normative deviations, and to weigh reforms that may restore independence.
Current law permits the President to remove an IG for any reason with notice
to Congress thirty days in advance.14 Despite the absence of a removal limitation in the
law, IGs have rarely been removed during a President’s term in office, based on a
generally accepted consensus across political parties to respect their independent oversight.15 President Trump shattered this long-standing consensus with the firings of
IGs and replacement of acting IGs in April and May 2020.16 He terminated Michael
Atkinson, the IG for the intelligence community, who had previously notified Congress about the whistleblower complaint that gave rise to the impeachment proceedings against President Trump related to Ukraine.17 He also fired Steve Linick, the
IG for the State Department, at the request of Secretary Michael Pompeo, who was
subject to several IG investigations at the time, including one for misuse of funds.18
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2013) (evaluating the effectiveness of IG
reviews of national security decisions that infringed individual rights during the George W.
Bush administration); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 99–109 (2012) (offering
an account of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) IG’s review of interrogation practices
during the Bush administration); Bromwich, supra note 6, at 2029–30 (former DOJ IG’s comparison of IG practices with independent counsel investigations). For public administration
scholarship that discusses the history of IGs, their duties, and powers, see generally CHARLES
A. JOHNSON & KATHRYN E. NEWCOMER, U.S. INSPECTORS GENERAL: TRUTH TELLERS IN
TURBULENT TIMES (2019); PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL
AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
13
See infra Section I.B.3.
14
5 U.S.C. § 3(b).
15
See, e.g., JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra note 12, at 7.
16
See Jeremy Herb, Zachary Cohen & Jason Hoffman, Trump Defends Firing Intelligence
Community Watchdog, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 4, 2020, 7:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020
/04/04/politics/trump-michael-atkinson-inspector-general-fired/index.html [https://perma.cc
/5X9W-CYJD]; Nicole Gaouette, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler & Zachary Cohen, Fired
State Department Watchdog Was Conducting 5 Probes Into Potential Wrongdoing, CNN
POLITICS (June 10, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/politics/linick-con
gress-transcript-state-dept/index.html [https://perma.cc/L3BV-VP3X].
17
See Herb, Cohen & Hoffman, supra note 16.
18
See Gaouette, Atwood, Hansler & Cohen, supra note 16.
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Moreover, the President replaced three acting IGs, who had issued critical reports
or were engaged in sensitive ongoing oversight work, and, in some cases, he temporarily replaced them with agency political appointees subject to clear conflicts of
interest.19 Nothing in the law prevented these removals and replacements.
One recent proposal to prevent future presidential abuses of power would codify
the default norm against IG termination by restricting presidential removal to specific,
documented reasons set forth in the law, including but not limited to “neglect of
duty,” “a knowing violation of a law or regulation,” and “abuse of authority.”20 Had
this removal for cause protection existed when the President fired the intelligence
community and State Department IGs, the provision would have prohibited such
actions. In June 2021, the House of Representatives passed one of the bills—the
Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act—that provides IG removal
for cause protection.21
However, if enacted, a substantial question exists as to whether the removal for
cause provision would withstand constitutional scrutiny under existing case law.
Soon after the President’s removal and replacement of IGs, the Supreme Court
19

Sam Mintz, Democrats Blast Removal of Acting DOT Inspector General, POLITICO
(May 19, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/19/democrats-blast-re
moval-of-acting-dot-inspector-general-268611 [https://perma.cc/JS43-JE3K] (describing replacement of the Acting IG for the Department of Transportation, who was purportedly investigating
the DOT Secretary’s steering of funds to Kentucky to support Mitch McConnell’s reelection,
and the naming of a political appointee as the new acting IG); Lisa Rein, Trump Replaces
HHS Watchdog Who Found ‘Severe Shortages’ at Hospitals Combating Coronavirus, WASH.
POST (May 2, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/top-hhs-watchdog-be
ing-replaced-by-trump-says-inspectors-general-must-work-free-from-political-intrusion/20
20/05/26/5c83f41a-9f49-11ea-9590-1858a893bd59_story.html [https://perma.cc/WQM4-BUBU]
(replaced the Acting IG for the Department of Health and Human Services, not long after she
issued a report on hospitals’ challenges responding to the pandemic); Charlie Savage & Peter
Baker, Trump Ousts Pandemic Spending Watchdog Known for Independence, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-watch
dog-glenn-fine.html [https://perma.cc/JN3H-BBM6] (replaced the acting leader of the Department of Defense IG, which also displaced him as the lead IG on a committee tasked with
oversight of over $2 trillion in emergency pandemic funds).
20
See, e.g., Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662,
117th Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021); Protecting Our Democracy Act
of 2020, H.R. 8363, 116th Cong. §§ 702, 1201 (as introduced in the H. Comm. on Oversight
& Reform in addition to other committees, Sept. 23, 2020); Inspectors General Independence
Act of 2020, H.R. 6984, 116th Cong. § 2(a-I) (as introduced in the H. Comm. on Oversight
& Reform, May 22, 2020); Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, S. 3664, 116th
Cong. § 2(a) (as introduced in S. Comm. On Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
May 7, 2020); Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, H.R. 6668, 116th Cong. § 2(a)
(as introduced in H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, May 1, 2020).
21
Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
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decided Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which held, by
a five to four majority, that removal protection for the agency director was an unconstitutional encroachment on the separation of powers.22 Although the Supreme
Court had long recognized legislative authority to limit presidential removal of
officers,23 the Court foreshadowed the instability of removal limits with its previous
repudiation of multilevel good cause protections in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.24 Seila Law went further in reframing its
prior precedents to narrow the grounds for Congress to protect the independence of
officers with limitations on the removal power.25 As captured by the dissent, in
recasting without overtly overruling prior decisions, the Court hastened its further
ideological drift toward the unitary executive theory’s formalist conception of executive power and away from functional, legislative limits on removal authority.26
The Court’s recent invalidation of for-cause removal limits pose important
constitutional considerations for Congress as it weighs such protection for IGs. This
Article argues that Congress retains authority to place reasonable limits on the
President’s power to remove IGs. Despite the Seila Law majority’s endorsement of
a broad removal power, the Court left intact prior decisions that permitted some legislative limits on removal of officers, albeit reconfigured as narrow “exceptions” for
(1) multimember commissions with “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” duties and
(2) “inferior officers” with limited duties who lack policymaking authority.27 Though
IGs do not fall in the former exception because they are not part of a commission,
they satisfy the latter.28 IGs are inferior officers who lack direct enforcement authority and rely on higher-level executive officers to act upon their findings of
deficiencies and recommendations for reform.29 Removal protection for IG independence is permissible because ultimate accountability rests with the President and
agency heads who retain control to act on oversight to promote good government.
Nonetheless, the Article explores additional considerations for crafting reforms.
If Congress simply amends the law to provide removal protection for all IGs, the
22

140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988); Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–32 (1935).
24
561 U.S. 477, 509–10, 514 (2010).
25
140 S. Ct. at 2198 (construing Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor as “exceptions” to
a “general rule” of at-will removal).
26
See id. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part). Compare Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 596–99
(1994) (articulating the formalist unitary executive theory), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108–14, 116–18
(1994) (offering a functionalist critique).
27
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192, 2198–2200.
28
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690–92.
29
See id. at 654; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1989).
23

8

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1

law may confront a Free Enterprise Fund problem by creating a dual for-cause
removal structure with respect to IGs assigned to several agencies, boards, and
commissions where the heads have such protection.30 The Article also addresses
three alternative IG institutional structures as possible mechanisms to strengthen IG
independence and accommodate removal limits: (1) independent, multimember
commissions; (2) court-appointed officers; and (3) agency appointees. These new
structures are imperfect responses to presidential abuse and the Court’s departure
from the long-standing constitutional principle identified by the Seila Law dissent—
“Congress could protect from at-will removal the officials it deemed to need some
independence from political pressures,” as long as limits did not impede the President’s execution of duties.31 The Article concludes that a tailored removal for cause
provision, without a corresponding structural change, can reasonably protect independence, avoid the Free Enterprise Fund problem, and offer a workable standard
that prohibits retaliatory terminations and reserves removal for instances that warrant accountability.
The Article then examines a legislative proposal that would limit acting IGs to
staff already assigned to IG offices. The Inspector General Empowerment and Independence Act sets a default rule that the “first assistant” in an IG office becomes
acting IG in the event of a vacancy and, if unavailable, the President may then designate
a senior official from within an IG office.32 By limiting succession to existing IG
staff, this proposal would prohibit a future president from installing a political appointee outside the IG community into the acting role,33 thereby preventing the
conflicts of interest that resulted from President Trump’s temporary appointments.
At the same time, existing proposals do not adequately respond to President Trump’s
partisan selections for permanent IG appointments or long-standing IG vacancies.34
The Article suggests revision of current eligibility requirements and appointment
procedures to ensure objective qualification standards for IG appointments, introduce greater regularity in the appointment process, and enhance the likelihood of
independent candidates for IG nominations.
30

See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 514.
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2233 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).
32
See Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021); see also Securing Inspector General Independence Act, S. 587, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (as introduced by S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, Mar. 4, 2021) (similar provisions on acting IGs).
33
See id.
34
See Inspector General Protection Act, H.R. 23, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (as passed by the
House Jan. 5, 2021) (requiring a written explanation to Congress about vacancies of more than
210 days and notice to Congress when IG is placed on administrative leave); Coronavirus
Oversight and Recovery and Ethics (“CORE”) Act, H.R. 7076, 116th Cong. § 8(d) (as introduced in the House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, June 1, 2020) (temporary IG appointment
by a panel of IGs after 210 days).
31
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The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of the IG institution, explains the sources of IG independence, and sets forth the legal and historical
background concerning the external separation of powers, including disputes between the President and Congress over IG independence.35 Part II discusses adherence
to norms of IG independence by past presidents who mostly observed restraint
against removing IGs and describes President Trump’s retaliatory removals and
replacements of IGs, as well as his designation of existing political appointees as
acting IGs and permanent IG nominations after the removals.36 Part III analyzes
proposals to reinforce IG independence.37 This Part examines the constitutionality of
IG removal for cause proposals, considers alternative IG institutional structures, and
applies the proposed law to particular cases.38 It also weighs the policy reasons for
restrictions on acting IG appointments and stronger qualifications for permanent
appointments.39 Analysis of the law of oversight independence reveals the interplay
between internal institutional constraints, the separation of powers, and the dynamics of presidential accountability.
I. INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
This Part provides an overview of IGs as a central oversight institution of the
federal government. In addition to historical background, this Part explains the sources
of IG independence and conceptualizes the institution as part of the internal separation of powers. Further, it surveys relevant theories and case law pertaining to the
external separation of powers, as well as underlying values of political accountability
and good government. This Part also discusses some historical examples of disputes
between the President and Congress about IGs and the separation of powers.
A. Inspectors General in the Federal System
IGs are the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch assigned to departments
and agencies to conduct investigations, audits, and evaluations of government
employees, contractors, and programs.40 The purview of IGs span across a spectrum
of individual misconduct and systemic deficiencies. Broadly speaking, IGs make
factual findings, offer recommendations, and issue reports concerning fraud, corruption, mismanagement, waste, abuse, conflicts of interest, performance failures,
and noncompliance with law and policy.41 This oversight supports a range of
35

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
37
See infra Part III.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Bromwich, supra note 6, at 2030.
41
See generally COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
(CIGIE), THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 9 (2014).
36
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potential remedial actions, including criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, disciplinary actions, contractor debarment, programmatic reforms, and legislative policy
changes.42 IGs have earned a reputation for enhancing public trust in the integrity
and effectiveness of government.
Although IGs are an established component of the government’s oversight
infrastructure today, the institution’s expansion remains a relatively recent phenomenon in American history. During the Revolutionary War, at George Washington’s
recommendation, the Continental Congress created an IG for the Army to review
organizational problems in the military.43 For nearly two hundred years, while the
military continued to have IGs, other departments and agencies did not incorporate
the institution, with a few exceptions.44 The abuses of the Watergate era ushered in
a host of government reforms.45 During this period, Congress took incremental steps
toward the expansion of federal IG oversight. In 1976, Congress created an IG for
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which later became the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).46 Soon thereafter, in 1977, Congress
assigned an IG to the Department of Energy.47 These predecessor statutes served as
models for the Inspector General Act of 1978.48
The Inspector General Act sought for IGs to (1) “to conduct and supervise audits
and investigations relating to [agency] programs and operations”; (2) “to provide
leadership and coordination and recommend policies” to “promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness” and “detect fraud and abuse” in government programs;
and (3) to inform agency heads and Congress about agency deficiencies and the need
42

See OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/investigations [https://perma.cc/WKE9
-PBM6] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (for the period from 2013 to 2020, reporting over 40,000
successful criminal prosecutions, 11,000 civil actions, 41,000 suspensions or debarments,
33,000 personnel actions, and $146 billion in recoveries).
43
DAVID A. CLARY & JOSEPH W.A. WHITEHORNE, THE INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY 1777–1903 23–27 (1985). Notable IGs for the Army included Baron
von Steuben, whom some consider one of the most important military figures during the War
alongside Washington, and Alexander Hamilton, who took on the role after Washington returned to lead the military in 1798. See id. at 59–60, 75–77.
44
See LIGHT, supra note 12, at 27–29, 31–32 (discussing the creation of a statutory IG
at the State Department in 1959 to audit foreign assistance programs and the hiring of an IG
at the Department of Agriculture after a fraud scandal in 1962).
45
These reforms included the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92
Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 401); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 1101); and the Independent
Counsel Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–73 (1978) (repealed 1999).
46
Pub. L. No. 94-505, §§ 201–02, 90 Stat 2429 (1976).
47
Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 208, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
48
Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, reprinted as amended
in 5 U.S.C. app. See generally CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 1–2 (2019) [hereinafter STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL].
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for “corrective action.”49 Legislative history indicates lawmakers’ concerns with fraud,
waste, and abuse of “epidemic proportions,” a lack of oversight resources, emphasis
on “program operation over program oversight,” and the “inherent conflict of interest” posed by operational officials’ supervision of oversight units.50 To remedy
these problems, the 95th Congress enacted the Inspector General Act with strong
bipartisan support.51
The Act effectuated a segregation of duties between IGs and policy administrators.52 IGs were explicitly excluded from having “program operating responsibilities,”53 which remained the domain of administrators. Rather, the law granted IGs
wide latitude to review agency operations and to determine the subjects for investigative inquiries.54 IGs operate under the “general supervision” of the agency head,
but the agency head is barred from “prevent[ing] or prohibit[ing] the [IG] from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any
subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.”55 IGs have substantial
authority to conduct investigations as they are authorized to access agency records,
subpoena records from nongovernmental entities, and take testimony under oath.56
While the Inspector General Act originally assigned twelve IGs to federal departments, their number has since grown to seventy-four statutory IGs.57
The President appoints roughly half of IGs with the Senate’s advice and consent,
while the other half are appointed directly by agency heads, boards, or commissions.58 Appointments must be made “without regard to political affiliation and
49

Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2(a)(1–3).
S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 4–7 (1978); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-584, at 5 (1977).
51
See 124 CONG. REC. 30955 (Sept. 22, 1978) (unanimous vote for the Act in the Senate);
124 CONG. REC. 9529, 10410 (Apr. 18, 1978) (only six votes opposed in the House, including
then Representatives Al Gore and Leon Panetta).
52
See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2 (stating that the “[p]urpose” of the Act was creation of “independent and objective units”); see also S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 7 (1978) (explaining
the intent to substitute IGs to address conflict “when audit and investigative operations are
under the authority of an individual whose programs are being audited”).
53
Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 8G(b), 9(a)(2).
54
See id. § 6(a)(2) (stating that IGs may initiate reviews “relating to the administration
of the programs and operations of the [agency] as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General,
necessary and desirable”).
55
Id. § 3(a); see also United States Nuclear Regul. Comm’n v. FLRA., 25 F.3d 229, 235
(4th Cir. 1994) (describing the agency head’s “general supervision” authority over IGs as
“nominal”).
56
See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 6(a).
57
See STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 48, at 4 (explaining that the Act
governs 65 of the 74 statutory IGs in the federal system, and that the remaining IGs, such as
IGs in the intelligence community, are governed by separate statutes).
58
See Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 3(a), 8G(c); JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra note
12, at 105 (distinguishing presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed IGs (PAS IGs) from
designated federal entity IGs (DFE IGs) who are appointed directly by agency heads, boards,
or commissions).
50
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solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”59
Removal of an IG requires that the relevant authority specified in the statute—the
President or agency head—“communicate in writing the reasons” for removal to
Congress thirty days in advance.60
B. Oversight Independence and the Internal Separation of Powers
1. Oversight Independence in the Executive Branch
A fundamental principle of IG oversight is independence—the commitment to
objective review, fact-finding, and reporting based on a sufficient degree of freedom
from outside interference or political pressure.61 Similar to the concepts of prosecutorial or investigative independence,62 oversight independence involves the exercise
of impartial professional judgment and some insulation from the programs and officials
subject to review.63 One primary difference is a matter of purview and mission: oversight independence extends beyond the work of criminal law enforcement agencies
to oversight institutions that cover a broad field of inquiry relating to government
activity.64 In the case of IGs,65 this work includes criminal investigations, often
59

Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 3(a), 8G(c).
Id. §§ 3(a)(2), 8G(e)(2); see also Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-409, § 3(a), 122 Stat. 4302, 4306 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 11) (adding the
thirty-day requirement to the notice provision).
61
See CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATION 3–4 (2020).
62
See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 5, at 262 (explaining that prosecutorial independence requires “insulation of federal prosecutors from political direction from the White House” because interference “delegitimize[s] the prosecutorial process by raising the risk of politically
motivated decisions”).
63
See CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATION, supra note 61,
at 3 (stating that independence is necessary “so that opinions, findings, conclusions, judgments,
and recommendations will be impartial,” and that oversight staff “be alert to possible threats
to independence”); CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INVESTIGATIONS 7 (2011) (stating that
independence may be compromised by external “[i]nterference,” requires staff “be positioned
outside the staff or reporting line of the unit or employees under investigation,” and ensures that
oversight decisions are “impartial and . . . viewed as impartial by knowledgeable third parties”).
64
See CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 4–6
(2012).
65
Although this Article explores the concept of oversight independence by examination
federal IG oversight, a number of institutions conduct independent government oversight and
warrant further scholarly attention, including the United States Office of the Special Counsel
(OSC) and the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), as well as state and local IG offices and
ethics commissions. See, e.g., U.S. OFF. OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9–10 (2019) (explaining that the OSC is an independent agency that investigates violations of several federal statutes, including the Hatch Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, and
60
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conducted in joint partnership with prosecutors, but also encompasses noncriminal
civil, ethics, or disciplinary investigations; financial audits; program reviews; contract
vetting and monitoring; and scrutiny of government decisions for compliance with
law or policy.66 Oversight independence facilitates both a legitimate review process
and the reception of its results as credible—determinations and recommendations
are based on merit, rather than political or personal considerations.
What accounts for an oversight institution’s independence? As a feature of
certain federal agencies and officers, independence does not take “a single form.”67
One source of independence is law. Removal for cause protection that prohibits atwill discharge of an officer is generally considered the quintessential form of independence in establishing a layer of job protection.68 Appointment procedures also
bolster independence insofar as qualifications and vetting seek to ensure that the
candidate will operate in an independent manner.69 Scholarship on independent
agencies has recognized additional, common legal structures indicative of independence, including a specified term of office, multimember leadership, partisan balance
requirements, congressional reporting requirements, budgeting authority, and rulemaking, adjudicatory, investigatory, or enforcement powers.70
the Whistleblower Protection Act, with a primary objective of addressing prohibited personnel
practices against federal employees); JENNIFER AHEARN ET AL., CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY
& ETHICS, WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE 97–99 (Dec. 2, 2020) (describing the OGE’s role
in administering federal government’s financial disclosure and ethics compliance, while recommending policy changes); CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, AN OVERVIEW
OF STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (Aug. 2016)
(describing various state and local IG offices and ethics commissions with varying mandates
and responsibilities).
66
See generally CIGIE, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF INSPECTORS GENERAL AND TRANSITION TO A NEW ADMINISTRATION 8 (Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION HANDBOOK] (stating that IGs “have broad latitude to determine
the reviews they conduct and the reports they issue,” to perform audits, evaluations, and
inspections of agency programs and operations, and to conduct criminal, civil, and administrative investigations).
67
Kirti Datla & Richard Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013).
68
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1168 (2013) (“Commentators broadly agree that for-cause tenure protection is the sine
qua non of agency independence.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16 (2010) (describing and then challenging
the agreement of many scholars that “the defining hallmark of an independent agency is that
it is headed by someone who cannot be removed at will by the President but instead can be
removed only for good cause”).
69
Barkow, supra note 68, at 47 (“One way to create greater independence is to specify
qualifications for appointees so that the pool of potential candidates from which the President
picks is more limited and he or she cannot select solely on the basis of partisan leanings.”).
70
See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 67, at 775 (listing “seven indicia of independence” of agencies).
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Another source of independence is the informal norms that can mediate the
relationships between government institutions and actors, such as IGs and the President
or agency heads.71 They fill the interstitial gaps in law with regular practices and
courses of dealing that come to overlay these relationships. For instance, where law
may establish an oversight entity’s authority to demand information from an agency,
norms offer guidance as to engagement, cooperation, and compliance.72 Normative
commitments operate in a similar fashion to moral obligation insofar as they induce
respect for institutional independence.73 In the absence of for-cause removal restrictions, for example, independence norms may counsel restraint against termination
and supply a basis to judge deviations with blame, shame, or outrage.74
IG independence then is a product of the laws and norms that enable their
impartial review of government activity and operation as a check on executive power.
To explore this connection between IG independence and their institutional role
draws from and contributes to scholarship on the existence of an “internal separation
of powers,” which has focused attention on institutions within the Executive Branch
that operate in some measure as constraints on the President and agencies.75 The
traditional separation of powers, by contrast, refers to the tripartite structure of the
federal government that divides power into the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches.76 Though the Court has recognized the “interdependence” of the branches
of government,77 its separation of powers rulings have primarily concerned “encroachment” of one branch into another’s sphere or “aggrandizement” of excessive
power in one branch.78 The “internal separation of powers” discourse turns within the
71

See, e.g., Rehna, supra note 2, at 2189 (describing “norms” as “unwritten or informal rules
of political behavior [that] provide the infrastructure that any particular President inhabits”).
72
See id. at 2198–99.
73
See Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1185 (“[C]onventions are (1) regular patterns of political behavior (2) followed from a sense of obligation.”).
74
See id. at 1201 (discussing several examples where norms of independence operated
as “unwritten constraints on presidential removal,” including the firings of United States
Attorneys during the George W. Bush administration, where “the backlash was vigorous”
due to “a widespread sense that unwritten norms of independence had been compromised”).
75
See Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1029–31; Metzger, supra note 11, at 429; Katyal, supra
note 11, at 2347–48.
76
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (describing the Constitution’s separation
of powers “into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial”); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the separation of powers sought to “diffus[e] power the better to secure
liberty”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”).
77
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”).
78
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381–82; accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
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Executive Branch to analyze the effectiveness of internal institutional checks at addressing the modern concentration of power in the presidency and administrative agencies,79 as well as the advantages of internal constraints over the courts and Congress.80
2. Sources of Inspector General Independence
Several legal and institutional characteristics configure the IG institution for
independent oversight.81 To begin with, appointment criteria directs selection of
qualified, independent IGs “without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of integrity and demonstrated ability” in relevant areas of experience.82 Procedural removal requirements of advance notice to Congress and a statement of
reasons contemplates scrutiny that will follow removal decisions and the expectation
of a persuasive justification.83 The “structural insulation” of IG investigative and
audit functions from agency administrative functions offers perspectival distance
from matters under review, thereby enhancing objectivity and reducing risks of
favoritism.84 IGs are also considered a “separate agency” for certain administrative
purposes and have specific line items for their funding in agency budgets.85
Explicit prohibitions on agency head interference with investigative decisions,
along with broad investigatory powers, empower IGs to make objective judgments
about investigative steps.86 IGs also observe certain professional standards and
79

See Metzger, supra note 11, at 428 (explaining that “the focus of internal separation
of powers scholarship is overwhelmingly on the Executive Branch, reflecting the view that
the greatest threat of aggrandized power today lies in the broad delegations”); see also Jon
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 526 (2015)
(“Mini-governments unto themselves, administrative agencies combined legislative, executive,
and judicial functions in a way that effectively marginalized tripartite, constitutional government.”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1816–20
(1996) (discussing the expanding power of the administrative state).
80
See Michaels, supra note 79, at 534 (“Spawned, nurtured, and sustained by Congress
and the judiciary, these sub-constitutional, rivalrous counterweights constrain the political
leadership atop administrative agencies in ways more reliable and immediate than anything
the legislature or courts could regularly do.”); Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1029 (describing arguments that the oversight of internal executive institutions are “necessitated by congressional
enfeeblement and judicial abdication”); Metzger, supra note 11, at 439–40 (citing bicameralism
and other barriers to legislative action, and the standing doctrine and other “jurisdictional
barriers” to judicial intervention).
81
See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 3.
82
Id. §§ 3(a), 8G(c).
83
See S. REP. NO. 110-262, at 4 (2008) (explaining that the notice provision seeks to
“allow for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event that the planned transfer or
removal is viewed as an inappropriate or politically motivated attempt to terminate an effective Inspector General”).
84
See Metzger, supra note 11, at 429–30.
85
Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 6(e)(1)(A)(I), 6(g)(1), 8G(g)(1).
86
See id. §§ 3(a), 6(a).
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cultural norms that insist upon neutral, fact-based review.87 IG reviews and reports
adhere to quality standards for documentation, evidence, and methods.88 Staff in IG
offices include personnel from a range of disciplines, including attorneys, investigators, auditors, and data analysts, who are trained to perform objective investigations,
audits, and reviews, and share fidelity to the cause of good government oversight.89
The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), an interagency entity comprised of IGs across the government, enhances coordination among
the various IG offices and represents the interests of the IG community.90
Further, Congress and civil society organizations offer external support for the
IG mission. IGs are required through reporting to keep their respective agencies and
Congress “fully and currently informed.”91 IG reporting supplements—or more
critically compensates—for a lack of resources dedicated to congressional oversight
of the sprawling, complex federal bureaucracy, as well as legislative challenges in
compelling Executive Branch compliance with its demands for information.92 Consequently, members of Congress frequently call upon IGs to investigate particular
matters.93 Congress also holds oversight hearings to further explore IG findings and
87

See generally STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 48, at I.
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GENERALLY ACCEPTED GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS 1 (July 2018) (applies to audits); CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATION, supra note 61, at 1 (applies to other forms of programmatic
review); CIGIE, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 63, at 1 (applies to
misconduct investigations of employees, contractors, or program grantees); CIGIE, QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 64, at 3–4 (sets forth
the general quality standards for the management, operation, and conduct of IG offices).
89
See PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 9 (noting that IG offices
leverage “the multidisciplinary skills of investigators, auditors, evaluators, and lawyers”);
cf. Michaels, supra note 79, at 544 (making a similar point about professional civil servants,
who are generally thought to exercise nonpartisan skills and expertise with dedication to
advancing their agency’s mission).
90
See Inspector General Act of 1978 §§ 11(d)(2), (d)(4)(A) (Members of CIGIE include
all federal IGs, and the organization considers “policies, standards, and approaches” to enhance
IG “professionalism and effectiveness.”).
91
Id. § 4(a)(5).
92
See Molly E. Reynolds, Improving Congressional Capacity to Address Problems and
Oversee the Executive Branch, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Big-Ideas_Reynolds_Congressional_Capacity.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8F6J-VZ2A] (discussing the lack of sufficient resources for congressional oversight
and challenges obtaining information from the Executive Branch); Metzger, supra note 11,
at 444 (stating that “Congress needs information to conduct meaningful oversight of the
Executive Branch,” and relies on “watchdogs [as] important sources of that information”).
93
See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren et al., U.S. Senators, to Tammy L. Whitcomb,
Inspector General for the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 7, 2020) (requesting that the Postal
Service IG investigate staffing and policy changes that slowed mail delivery and “appear[ed]
to pose a potential threat to mail-in ballots and the 2020 general election”); Greg Clary &
Devan Cole, House Committee Chairs Call For IG Investigation into Use of Federal Officers
88
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legislative responses.94 Given its reliance on IG oversight to shine light on internal
executive practices, Congress has become an important defender of IGs’ oversight
independence. Civil society organizations focused on anticorruption and democratic
reform agendas,95 as well as the media,96 bring additional public attention to oversight
and buttress IG independence.
3. Inspectors General as Internal Constraint
Laws and norms, therefore, interact to create the structures, the patterns of behavior, and the commitments that we call IG independence. This independence is a
core component of IGs’ status as an “institutional counterweight” to executive power.97
IG oversight during the Trump administration offers an abundance of examples
where they scrutinized matters and challenged administration positions relating to
to Quell Portland and DC Protests, CNN POLITICS (July 19, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www
.cnn.com/2020/07/19/politics/investigation-federal-authorities-portland-dc-protests/index
.html [https://perma.cc/6V8Y-PPEF] (reporting that the Chairs for the House Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Oversight and Reform committees called upon the DOJ and DHS IGs to
investigate the deployment of federal agents in Portland, Oregon and Washington, DC to
respond to protests of the killing of George Floyd).
94
See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector General for the Dep’t of Homeland
Security, Children in CBP Custody: Examining Deaths, Medical Care Procedures, and Improper
Spending House Committee on Homeland Security, at 1–9 (July 15, 2020), available at https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/TM/2020/oigtm-inspector-general-joseph-v-cuf
fari-071520.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G2L-XESG] (testifying about Department of Homeland
Security IG investigations of two child deaths at the border and problematic detention conditions,
including overcrowding, after the expanded immigration enforcement of the Trump administration); Statement of Michael Horowitz, Inspector General for Dep’t of Justice, DOJ IG FISA
Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings, Hearing on DOJ OIG FISA Report Before the U.S.
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2019), available at https://oig.justice
.gov/node/16547 [https://perma.cc/DH3C-UYX2] (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Justice, on the DOJ IG report about the Russia investigation).
95
See, e.g., 161 Cong. Rec. S8665 (insertion into the record of a letter to Senators Chuck
Grassley and Claire McCaskill from the Executive Director of the Project on Government
Oversight, arguing in favor of increased IG access to agency records).
96
See, e.g., David Shortell et al., Inspector General: Start of FBI Russia Probe Was Justified and Unbiased but Investigation Had Significant Errors, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 9, 2019,
3:42 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/09/politics/ig-horowitz-report-russia-trump/index
.html [https://perma.cc/BU8C-BZZ7]. A Westlaw search for media articles in the three weeks
after release of the DOJ IG report about the Russia investigation yielded 1,090 articles.
97
See Michaels, supra note 79, at 534. Jon Michaels uses this term to describe institutions
within the Executive Branch that are “subconstitutional” and “rivalrous” constraints that not
only check administrative power, but also, legitimize it. Michaels discusses a triangular structure of agency leaders, civil servants, and civil society that form an “administrative separation
of powers.” The role of civil servants in this system, as nonpartisan proponents of compliance
with the rule of law and reasoned decisions, has affinities with IGs as counterweights, albeit
as the watchdogs of administrative government. See id.
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important public interests relating to criminal justice, immigration, public health,
science, and the professional civil service. Consider these examples:
•

•

•
•
•

the DOJ IG determined that the FBI had a reasonable basis for initiating
the investigation of whether the Trump campaign coordinated with
Russians to interfere with the 2016 presidential election;98
the Department of Homeland Security IG issued reports criticizing
“serious” overcrowding at detention facilities for migrant families and
children, as well failures to track children that DHS separated them
from their parents;99
the HHS IG found a lack of preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic
and questions about the federal government’s initial response;100
the Department of State IG identified instances of political retaliation
against civil servants by agency leaders;101
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) IG and HHS IG determined that the agency heads violated travel policies resulting in a waste
of government funds.102

IG reviews of the Trump administration persist in its aftermath.103
98

OFF.

OF THE INSPECTOR

GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF FOUR FISA AP-

PLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE INVESTIGATION i–viii

(2019).
99
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP SEPARATED MORE
ASYLUM-SEEKING FAMILIES AT PORTS OF ENTRY THAN REPORTED AND FOR REASONS OTHER
THAN THOSE OUTLINED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS 5–11 (2020).
100
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE
SURVEY MARCH 23–27 1–9 (2020) [hereinafter HHS IG COVID-19 HOSPITALS REPORT].
101
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS OF
POLITICIZED AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL PRACTICES INVOLVING THE OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY 12 (2019) [hereinafter STATE IG PERSONNEL PRACTICES REPORT].
102
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., ACTIONS NEEDED TO
STRENGTHEN CONTROLS OVER THE EPA ADMINISTRATOR’S AND ASSOCIATED STAFF’S
TRAVEL 8, 13 (2019); OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVS., THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DID NOT COMPLY
WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS FOR CHARTERED AIRCRAFT AND OTHER GOVERNMENT TRAVEL
RELATED TO FORMER SECRETARY PRICE 7–8 (2018).
103
See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Department of Justice
Inspector General Announces Investigation (Jan. 25, 2021), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/de
fault/files/2021-01/2021-01-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TV-J85V] (announcement of DOJ
IG “investigation into whether any former or current DOJ official engaged in an improper
attempt to have DOJ seek to alter the outcome of the 2020 Presidential Election”); Katie
Benner & Glenn Thrush, Federal Watchdogs Open Investigation Into Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/us/politics/capital-riot-investigation
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These examples demonstrate, at a minimum, the fidelity of IGs during this period
to conduct oversight of presidential and agency abuses. This is not to suggest that IG
oversight was always effective. It is important to evaluate how well institutional safeguards performed in response to the excesses and abuses of the Trump administration.104 Nonetheless, independence offered IGs a standpoint for speaking truth to
power by identifying and publicizing wrongdoing, failures, or deviations from the
rule of law. However, this period also revealed the fragility of that independence in the
President’s attacks on the institution. IG independence within the Executive Branch
relies on support from outside it. Congressional efforts to strengthen the internal
check of IG oversight implicates traditional separation of powers concerns regarding
the respective constitutional powers of the Executive and Legislative branches.105
C. Oversight Independence and the External Separation of Powers
The President wields extensive power over the administrative state, the direction
of policy execution, and the supervision of agencies, including through the exercise
of the appointment and removal powers.106 Congress has the power to create and
structure offices, as well as to determine their functions and powers.107 External
separation of powers doctrine generally comes into play when one of these branches
is purported to intrude on the powers of the other.108 For instance, when is congressional lawmaking that restricts the President’s removal power a permissible limitation or an impermissible intrusion? Do statutory qualifications for officers infringe
upon the President’s appointment powers? Such questions receive different responses in formalist and functionalist conceptions of the separation of powers, in the
decisions of a divided Court, and more specifically, in debates over the scope of IG
independence.
-justice-federal.html [https://perma.cc/PT37-PUS2] (reporting coordinated review by several IG
offices of the federal preparedness for and response to the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021).
104
Cf. Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1031 (evaluating the performance of IGs conducting national
security oversight in response to interrogation and detention abuses during the George W.
Bush administration).
105
See Metzger, supra note 11, at 426 (recognizing “the link between internal Executive
Branch constraints and external legal doctrine,” and advocating “greater exploration of how
separation of powers doctrine could be used to reinforce internal Executive Branch constraints”).
106
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
107
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizes appointment of “officers” to positions “which shall be established by law”); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976) (per curiam) (“Congress may undoubtedly under the
Necessary and Proper Clause create ‘offices’ in the generic sense and provide such method
of appointment to those ‘offices’ as it chooses.”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress
confers power upon it.”).
108
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
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1. Formalist and Functionalist Theories
In a formalist conception of the separation of powers, the President is the ultimate
source of administrative legitimacy.109 Stephen Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash,
among others, have advanced the unitary executive theory, arguing that the text of
Article II—mainly the Vesting Clause,110 but also the Take Care Clause111—establish
presidential control to direct and manage administrative action.112 The theory asserts
that an exclusive grant of law execution powers “prevents Congress from ever
making the administration independent of presidential control.”113 This explains the
unitary executive claim that, despite the absence of an explicit removal clause in the
Constitution, “the President may remove executive officers using his Vesting Clause
grant of ‘executive Power’ that allows him to superintend the execution of federal
law.”114 Alongside the theory’s textual and structural arguments is an appeal to political accountability—the elected President, rather than unelected bureaucrats, gives
administrative decisions their legitimacy.115
Functionalist critiques of the unitary executive theory not only challenge its
textualist and originalist claims, but also, identify a constitutional commitment to
legislative regulation of policy execution.116 Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig
charge that the unitary executive theory “ignores strong evidence that the framers
imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President at the summit, but a
large degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it thought
proper.”117 In their view, Congress has authority, specifically under the Necessary
and Proper Clause,118 to “act through laws” to define the “means” of law execution
109

See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 26, at 544.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.”).
111
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. . . .”).
112
See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 26, at 580–84.
113
Id. at 570.
114
Id. at 598. See also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165–66 (1992) (“The
practical consequence of this theory is dramatic: it renders unconstitutional independent agencies
and counsels to the extent that they exercise discretionary executive power.”).
115
See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 59 (1994) (arguing that by “the President’s unique claim to legitimacy” is
“being the only official who is accountable to a national voting electorate and no one else”).
116
See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2–3.
117
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2.
118
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Congress has the power “to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”).
110
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and to craft some reasonable limits on the exercise of executive power.119 It is a
nuanced view. The original constitutional arrangements permitted insulation of administrative officials from presidential control, though modern developments—
expansive discretionary functions of administrative agencies and changing views on
the political character of administration—demonstrate the need for a strong executive to comport with long-standing values of democratic accountability. Presidential
control is necessary but can be circumscribed if sufficient institutional considerations and values warrant independence. Thus, Congress may create independent
agencies, immunize certain functions from the President, and protect particular officers
against removal without cause.120
2. The Court’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s case law and positions of individual Justices reflects the division between formalist or functionalist approaches to separation of powers questions.
However, recent decisions on the removal power signal the ascendance of formalist
notions of presidential control and political accountability.121 The brief summary of
case law here aims to provide initial background and to highlight the competing
values present in these cases. Relevant doctrine will be discussed further in Part III
when examining the constitutionality of proposed IG removal for cause protections.
The Constitution is silent on the President’s removal power, and the Founders
did not discuss the issue at the Constitutional Convention.122 Thus, in Myers v. United
States, the Court turned for guidance to the First Congress and its enactment of a
presidential removal provision for the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs,
later known as the “Decision of 1789.”123 Based on an extended discussion of the
Decision of 1789, the Court articulated a broad presidential removal power and invalidated a law requiring Senate consent to remove an executive officer.124 However,
119

Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 68–69.
See id. at 106–16.
121
See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 352, 376 (2020) (contextualizing Seila Law as the culmination of the unitary executive
theory’s growing influence on the Court and describing the divisive majority and dissenting
opinions as no “mere difference of interpretation, but rather a serious political confrontation”);
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (tracing this
ascendance in Free Enterprise Fund and challenging its assumed causal connections between
removal, control, and democratic accountability).
122
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109–10 (1928).
123
Id. at 136 (while recognizing that a congressional enactment does not control determination of the constitutional removal power, the majority called the “the Decision of 1789”
by the First Congress, which included a number of the Founders, a “precedent”).
124
Id. at 111–36, 163–64.
120
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later cases recognized Myers as a narrow holding that the Senate could not misappropriate the removal power for itself by requiring its consent.125
In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, eight years after Myers, the Court
upheld removal for cause protection for members of the Federal Trade Commission,
after President Roosevelt attempted to replace one of the commissioners.126 The
Court explained that the constitutionality of the for-cause limitation was dependent
on “the character of the office,” and held that the provision was valid because the
FTC commissioners performed “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial” duties that
must be “free from executive control.”127 The Court contrasted the FTC’s implementation of legislative and judicial powers with “purely executive officers.”128
Then, in Morrison v. Olson,129 the Court shifted from a focus on the function of
an office to consider whether the for-cause limitation impairs the President’s
exercise of constitutional powers.130 Though the Court in Morrison recognized that
the independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act had executive responsibilities of investigation and prosecution, the Court upheld the requirement that the
Attorney General have good cause for termination.131 The Court explained that those
functions, though relevant, were not the sole consideration for evaluating removal
restrictions—”the real question” was whether the restriction “impede[d] the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.”132 The Court observed that the
“independent counsel is an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause, with
limited jurisdiction and tenure and lacking policymaking or significant administrative authority.”133 Although the independent counsel had “no small amount of
discretion and judgment in deciding how to carry out his or her duties,” the Court
determined that the removal for cause limitation did not “unduly” interfere with the
President’s authority.134
In recent cases, however, the Court has rejected removal for cause requirements
based, in part, on the President’s accountability for policy execution.135 In Free
125

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720, 726 (1986) (holding that “Congress cannot reserve
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment,” and interpreting Myers to prohibit Congress’s aggrandizement or participation
in the removal power); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (same as to Myers).
126
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
127
Id. at 628, 631.
128
Id. at 630–32.
129
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
130
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2322–23
(2000) (describing this shift in Morrison).
131
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.
132
Id. at 691–93.
133
Id. at 691.
134
Id. at 691–92.
135
See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Free Enter.
Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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Enterprise Fund, the Court confronted a double layer of removal for cause protections covering both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) members
and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) members under the
SEC’s supervision.136 Justice Roberts, writing for majority, stated that “[t]his novel
structure does not merely add to the Board’s independence, but transforms it.”137
The Court held the multilayered removal protection violated the Vesting Clause
because it “stripped” removal authority from the President or a senior official directly accountable to the President.138 More broadly, the opinion contained several
snippets of expansive rhetoric decrying the arrangement as an affront to presidential
accountability and control.139
In June 2020, the Court in Seila Law rejected the good cause limitation on
removal of the CFPB director.140 Chief Justice Roberts, writing again for the majority, explained that the President’s removal power “follows from the text of Article
II, was settled by the First Congress, and was confirmed in the landmark [Myers] decision.”141 The Court recast its prior case law as declaring a default at-will removal
rule subject to two “exceptions” where good cause requirements are permissible: (1)
multimember agencies that exercise “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” functions
as in Humphrey’s Executor, and (2) “inferior officers” with limited duties that do not
exercise policymaking or administrative authority as in Morrison.142 According to
the Court, the CFPB director did not satisfy either exception because the CFPB is
not a multimember agency, and its director wields significant enforcement authority
by administering an array of consumer protection statutes.143 Consequently, the
Court refused to extend good cause protection to a “‘new situation’”—a single
agency head—that had no historical antecedent.144 As in Free Enterprise Fund, the
Court invoked democratic accountability, opining that “the Framers made the President
the most democratic and politically accountable official in Government,”145 while
the CFPB director was “neither elected by the people nor meaningfully controlled
(through the threat of removal) by someone who is.”146
136

561 U.S. at 514.
Id. at 496.
138
Id.
139
See id. at 514 (“Without such power [to remove the board members], the President
could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would
stop somewhere else.”); id. at 497 (criticizing the “diffusion of power [that] carries with it
a diffusion of accountability”); id. at 497–98 (“The people do not vote for the ‘Officers of
the United States.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)).
140
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
141
Id. at 2191–92.
142
Id. at 2198–2200.
143
Id. at 2200–01.
144
Id. at 2201 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483).
145
Id. at 2203.
146
Id.
137

24

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1

Justice Kagan, in a forceful dissent, laid bare shortcomings in the majority’s
reading of the text,147 history,148 and the Court’s own precedents.149 She argued that
these sources “point not to the majority’s ‘general rule’ of ‘unrestricted removal power’
with two grudgingly applied ‘exceptions’.”150 Rather, the dissent maintained that
text, including the Necessary and Proper Clause which went unmentioned in the
majority opinion, and history “bestow discretion on the legislature to structure administrative institutions as the times demand, so long as the President retains the
ability to carry out his constitutional duties.”151 Despite the majority’s acknowledgment of its past approval of removal limits, it “wipe[d] out” protection for the CFPB
director by departing from precedent and rewriting the removal power doctrine.152
Contrary to the majority’s foundation for a broad removal power in political accountability, the dissent countered that legislative removal limits permissibly advance
values of “good governance.”153 According to the dissent, these values, along with
concerns about the Court’s institutional competence,154 warrant a “deferential approach” to congressional actions that seek to secure independence to promote the
integrity and effectiveness of administration.155
This past term, in Collins v. Yellen, the Court also rejected removal protection for
the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), ruling that “our decision
147

Id. at 2227–28 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that the Vesting Clause “can’t
carry all that weight” to support a broad removal power, noting Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion in Morrison that the Court could not “‘extrapolate’” such a broad power from “‘general
constitutional language.’” (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.29)).
148
Id. at 2229–31 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the history of the First Congress on the
removal power “‘highly ambiguous and prone to overreading’” (quoting John Manning, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1965 n.135 (2011))). Consistent with Justice Kagan’s observation, some scholars
have rejected the Decision of 1789 as a source against limitations on the removal power. See
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Imaginary Unitary Executive, LAWFARE (July 6, 2020,8:54
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/imaginary-unitary-executive [https://perma.cc/6Q6Q
-GF8B] (offering an account of the Decision of 1789 that identifies “historical errors” in the
Court’s reading of that history); Saikrishna B. Prakash, New Light on the History of the
Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1073 (2006) (unitary executive theorist observing
that “the Decision of 1789 did not endorse the view that Congress lacked authority to modify
the Constitution’s grant of removal power to the President”).
149
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).
150
Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting the majority).
151
Id. at 2226–27 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).
152
Id. at 2224, 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).
153
Id. at 2236 (“Congress has broad discretion to enact for-cause protections in pursuit
of good governance.”).
154
Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he Constitution—both as originally drafted
and as practiced—mostly leaves disagreements about administrative structure to Congress
and the President, who have the knowledge and experience needed to address them. Within
broad bounds, it keeps the courts—who do not—out of the picture.”); accord Free Enter. Fund
v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part).

2021] INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE LAW OF OVERSIGHT INDEPENDENCE

25

last Term in Selia Law is all but dispositive.”156 Unlike Selia Law, however, the Court
did not resolve the case by inquiring whether the FHFA director exercised “‘significant
executive power.’”157 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, declared that “the nature
and breadth of an agency’s authority is not dispositive in determining whether Congress
may limit the President’s power to remove [the agency] head.”158 Justice Kagan agreed
that Seila Law dictated the result, but rejected the majority’s “gratuitous” expansion
of Seila Law into a blanket rule that single agency directors are subject to removal
at will.159
3. Separation of Powers Disputes over IG Independence
Inasmuch that separation of powers theory and case law reflect disagreement on
the boundaries for legislative limits on executive power, periodic conflicts between
the President and Congress over the scope of IG independence have reflected this
dynamic. The issue has, at times, been a deeply contested point of contention involving disputes about presidential control and legislative constraint.
In 1977, prior to enactment of the Inspector General Act, the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) published an opinion challenging its constitutionality and seeking modifications on the ground that “continuous oversight” by
IGs would “assume the Executive’s role of administering or executing the law.”160
More specifically, OLC objected that IG reporting to Congress would create “divided
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches,” based
on IG reporting requirements to Congress and a lack of presidential control.161 OLC
also argued that notice requirements to remove an IG would violate the removal power
156

141 S. Ct. 1761, 1783 (2021).
Id. at 1801 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (quoting Seila Law, 140
S. Ct. at 2241).
158
Id. at 1784.
159
Id. at 1801 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (charging that “the majority strays from its own obligation to respect precedent”).
160
Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Inspector
General Legislation 17 (Feb. 21, 1977) [hereinafter OLC IG Opinion].
161
Id. at 16; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 9 (1977) (noting a DOJ argument that
“provisions of the bill requiring reports of the Inspector General to be submitted to Congress
without further clearance or approval would deprive the President of his constitutional right
‘to coordinate the replies and comments to Congress from departments and agencies in the
executive branch.’” (quoting Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, to
Honorable Jack Brooks, Chair of House Committee on Government Operations (May 20,
1977))); Establishment of Offices of Inspector General: Hearing on H.R. Before the H. Comm.
on Intergov. Rels. & Hum. Res. Subcomms. of the Comm. on Gov. Ops., 95th Cong. 165 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Laurence H. Fountain, chair of House hearings on the IG Act) (noting that
“Presidents—not just this one—don’t want Congress seeking out or getting information
statutorily because they feel that it in some way infringes upon their rights”).
157
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“reserved to the President acting in his discretion.”162 Ultimately, the Inspector
General Act’s reporting and notice requirements remained intact.163
When Congress later contemplated the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008,
it considered amendments to strengthen IG independence, including a bill proposing
removal for cause protection and specified terms of office.164 The impetus for these
proposals were reports of politicization, pressure, and retaliation against IGs conducting oversight activities.165 Conflicting information exists as to whether the IG
community supported the removal for-cause and fixed tenure provisions.166 The
Bush administration threatened to veto the bill, asserting “grave constitutional
concerns” with for-cause limits on the President’s removal power.167 The House
nonetheless voted overwhelmingly for the bill containing the removal for cause and
162

OLC IG Opinion, supra note 160, at 18. OLC also questioned the statutory qualifications
for IGs as a possible violation of the appointment power, though it did not suggest any modification. Id.
163
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 3 (declaring the need for IGs to bypass agency heads by
reporting information to Congress “without further clearance or approval”); S. REP. No. 951071, at 9, 26 (1978) (stating that notice sought “some justification” for removal beyond
oversight that “embarrasses the executive,” and citing case law permitting removal limits for
“those offices whose duties require a degree of independence”).
164
See Improving Government Accountability Act, H.R. 928, 110th Cong. § 2(a–b) (as
introduced in H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, Feb. 8, 2007).
165
S. REP. NO. 110-262, at 3 (2008) (“[T]he Committee is aware of several instances of
real or perceived encroachments on IG authority. Just in the past year, for instance, there have
been several public accounts from current or former [IGs] who believed they were being
improperly pressured or denied resources to carry out needed oversight.”); H.R. REP. NO.
110-354, at 9 (2007) (expressing concerns with “campaigns by management to remove [IGs]
who are aggressive in their investigations” and citing several examples of interference with
IG oversight by agency officials).
166
Compare Statement of Phyliss Fong, Inspector General for the U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture and Chair of the Legislation Committee of the President’s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (PCIE), House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, at 4 (June 20,
2007), https://www.usda.gov/oig/reports/statement-honorable-phyllis-k-fong-inspector-general
-subcommittee-government-0 [https://perma.cc/R4BZ-6547] (stating of the bill’s removal for
cause and fixed term provisions that “[a] majority of the IG community believes that these
provisions of H.R. 928, if enacted, would enhance the independence of IGs”), with S. REP.
NO. 110-262, at 5 (2008) (stating that while IGs “widely endorsed” advance notice requirements
for removal, they “were divided over proposals to create fixed terms for IGs with dismissal
only ‘for cause’”), and GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL’S PANEL ON FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND INSPECTORS GENERAL 6 (2006) [hereinafter
GAO 2006 REPORT] (reporting that the majority of panel participants supported advance
notice requirements, while implying the majority did not support removal for cause).
167
George W. Bush, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 928—To Amend the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (Oct. 1, 2007) (“The Administration strongly objects to this intrusion on
the President’s removal authority and his ability to hold IGs accountable for their performance.”),
available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-administration-policy-hr
-928-amend-the-inspector-general-act-1978-enhance-the [https://perma.cc/F82C-QPNY].
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tenure provisions.168 However, the Senate omitted these provisions from its own bill
and inserted the 30-day notice requirement for IG removals, which ultimately
became the law.169
These past events suggest several observations. First, Congress has been motivated to reinforce good government oversight in response to abuse. The IG Act was
a response to the Watergate era, widespread fraud, and the lack of independent oversight institutions in the Executive Branch.170 Similarly, the Inspector General Reform
Act responded to numerous instances of interference with IG oversight.171 Second,
Congress has historically defended IG independence,172 but has not displayed uniform agreement as to the best methods for protecting oversight from interference or
pressure. Third, constitutional considerations factor into political realities surrounding
the development and advocacy for legislative proposals pursuing IG independence.
Constitutional objections, as well as the veto threat, loomed large in debate over the
removal for cause proposal that was originally part of the Inspector General Reform
Act.173 In addition to politics, the likelihood that a proposal will withstand constitutional scrutiny under existing law is a critical component in crafting policy choices.
When threats to IG independence jeopardize the effective performance of objective
IG oversight, it is necessary to examine how laws and norms performed in defense
of independence from such threats, and to weigh the potential constitutional and
policy implications of available legislative responses.
II. THREATS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE
Threats to IG independence include interference or retaliation by the President,
agency heads, and other executive officials that endangers the objectivity, legitimacy, and effectiveness of oversight.174 Notwithstanding normative standards of
independence, IGs they face risks of interference or retaliation because they probe
168

See CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL: LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
that the bill passed the House by a 404 to 11 vote).
169
See Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302; see
also Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-317, § 6(1)(A), 130 Stat.
1595, 1603 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. § 6) (more recent example where Congress
enacted legislative changes to reaffirm IG access to agency records after the Obama administration argued in favor of restrictions).
170
See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101,
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app.
171
See generally Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302.
172
See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101,
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app.; Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-409, 122 Stat. 4302; Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-317,
§ 6(1)(A), 130 Stat. 1595, 1603 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. § 6).
173
See George W. Bush, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 928—To Amend the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (Oct. 1, 2007).
174
See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
AND LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2007) (noting
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misconduct and expose failures.175 This Part will focus specifically on use of removal and appointment powers to neutralize or punish oversight.
In April and May 2020, President Trump breached the norms of independence
when he fired two permanent IGs and replaced three acting IGs for their legitimate exercise of oversight responsibilities.176 This Part discusses the history of IG removals
across administrations since the passage of the Inspector General Act, demonstrates
that President Trump’s adverse actions against IGs were a significant normative
deviation, and explains that the primary, current safeguard to prevent unjustified IG
dismissals—advance notice to Congress—failed to operate as intended. In addition,
this Part identifies additional challenges relating to IG appointments, including
outstanding vacancies and the designation of acting IGs.
A. Presidential Abuse of the Removal Power
1. Norms of Restraint
Under current law, the President can remove an IG from their position with 30
days advance notice to Congress.177 Despite the absence of protection beyond this
procedural notice requirement, past presidents have mostly refrained from removal.178
A long-standing, bipartisan consensus exists that IGs should retain their roles during
transitions after elections, despite the fact that most political appointees leave during
changes in administration.179 Equally important, independence norms have supported the apolitical expectation that the President will not remove an IG for conducting oversight that questions, challenges, or critiques the administration.180
This consensus arose, in part, because of the exceptions. When President Reagan
informed Congress on his first day in office that he removed sixteen IGs, the response was swift bipartisan condemnation.181 Indeed, no President since Reagan has
175

See Bromwich, supra note 6, at 2032–33.
See Quinn, supra note 7.
177
5 U.S.C. § 3(b).
178
See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CAL.
L. REV. 1375, 1396 (2017) (“[U]nlike with most other political appointees, new administrations
have refrained from asking current IGs to resign.”).
179
See id.; Bromwich, supra note 6, at 2029 (observing that IGs are expected to “survive
a change in party control of the White House”).
180
See, e.g., Letter from Charles S. Grassley, Senator, et al. to Donald Trump, President,
at 2 (Apr. 8, 2020) [hereinafter Grassley et al.].
181
See Robert Pear, Ouster of All Inspectors General by Reagan Called a Political Move,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1981, at B14 (discussing objections of Republicans and Democrats, including Representative Fountain, a chief sponsor of the IG Act, who said that despite the
President’s removal power, “[i]t was never intended . . . that inspectors general be automatically
replaced on a wholesale basis without regard to their individual merits whenever there is a
change in administrations”); Francis Clines, Reagan Reappoints Five to be Inspectors General,
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ordered a blanket termination of IGs with a change in administration, though some
considered doing so. George H.W. Bush sought to terminate IGs but relented after
objections by the IGs and Congress.182 Presidents Clinton, Obama, and George W.
Bush do not appear to have sought to terminate IGs at the beginning of their administrations.183 The Trump administration backed away from plans to remove IGs after
IGs raised concerns.184
Individual IG removals outside of changes in administration have been especially rare. One prominent case involved President Obama’s termination of Gerald
Walpin, the IG for the Corporation for National and Community Service, six months
after Obama took office.185 In his notice to Congress, President Obama simply stated
that he “no longer” had “fullest confidence” in Walpin.186 In subsequent letters and
explanations, Obama administration officials set forth specific reasons for the termination, while members of Congress questioned the sufficiency of the White House’s
explanations.187 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the President’s notice
to Congress was adequate because the “explanation satisfie[d] the minimal statutory
mandate” of the IG Act, which “impose[d] no ‘clear duty’ to explain the reasons in
any greater detail.”188
Historically, presidents and agency heads have used the removal power sparingly. As an alternative, administrations have sometimes facilitated IG departures
without the publicity that would result from outright removal by quietly pressuring
IGs to resign their positions.189 In addition, some resignations followed investigations of IG misconduct.190 Yet, as to removal, presidents have mostly observed
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1981, at B8 (reporting that Reagan later reappointed five of the removed IGs).
182
See JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra note 12, at 108.
183
See id. at 122.
184
See Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Transition Team Reverses Course on
Warnings to Oust Inspectors General, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/trump-transition-reverses-course-on-warnings-to-remove-in
spectors-general/2017/01/19/09312a12-ddfa-11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html [https://
perma.cc/78WS-VD4C].
185
See Neil A. Lewis, White House Defends Inspector General’s Firing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2009, at A24.
186
See STAFF OF S. FINANCE COMM. & HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM,
111th CONG., THE FIRING OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL
AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 47 (2009).
187
See id. at 23–24, 47–48 (noting several issues identified by administration officials to
support Walpin’s termination, including a complaint by an Acting United States Attorney,
Walpin’s telecommuting work arrangement, and his fitness to serve in office, and explaining that
Walpin’s office had recently investigated a political ally of the President prior to the termination).
188
Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l and Cmty. Servs., 630 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
189
See JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra note 12, at 128 (identifying two IGs pressured to
resign by President George H.W. Bush and eight IGs pressured to leave by agencies).
190
See id. (noting five IGs left office after investigations); H.R. REP. NO. 110-354, at 9–10
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norms of restraint. Even with Reagan’s summary removals at the beginning of his
first term and Obama’s solitary dismissal early in his first term,191 no President had
systematically used the removal power to oust IGs under circumstances suggesting
the move was retribution for past oversight or sought to impede ongoing scrutiny.
Until President Trump.192
2. President Trump’s Removal and Replacement of IGs
Nothing compares with President Trump’s dismissal of two IGs and replacement
of three acting IGs over the course of six weeks in April and May 2020. A review
of the timing and circumstances of these actions indicates retaliation for IGs’ proper
discharge of oversight responsibilities or an effort to subvert active matters.
On April 3, 2020, President Trump informed Congress that he was terminating
Michael Atkinson, the IG for the intelligence community.193 Atkinson had previously determined that the Director of National Intelligence must send Congress the
anonymous whistleblower complaint alleging that President Trump solicited foreign
interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential election by conditioning official actions,
including foreign military aid, on Ukraine’s agreement to investigate then presidential candidate Joe Biden.194 After the disclosure,195 the House pursued an impeachment investigation and later voted to impeach President Trump on charges of abuse
of power and obstruction of Congress.196 Following his acquittal by the Senate, the
President proceeded to retaliate against individuals who reported information to
Congress in connection with the impeachment investigation, including Atkinson.197
(2007) (describing investigation of an IG “for taking trips with no apparent official purpose at
government expense, retaliating against employees who objected and refused to sign the
travel vouchers, and destroying emails after he was informed of an investigation into his travel”).
191
See Pear, supra note 181; Lewis, supra note 185.
192
See Quinn, supra note 7.
193
Letter from Donald Trump, President, to Richard Burr, Senator, Chair of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Mark R. Warner, Senator, Vice Chair of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Atkinson Notice of Removal Letter].
194
See Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General for the Intelligence Community,
to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, at 6 (Aug. 26, 2019) (enclosing
the anonymous whistleblower’s letter and determining that the allegations constituted an “urgent
concern” requiring the Director of National Intelligence to report to the Congressional
Intelligence Committees).
195
See Nicholas Fandos, Complaint in Hand, Democrats Aim for a Fast, and Focused,
Impeachment Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us
/politics/trump-impeachment-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/B2EQ-Q3TV] (reporting that
the whistleblower letter was released to Congress on September 26, 2019, after Maguire initially
refused to disclose).
196
Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong.
(2019) (enacted).
197
See Herb, Cohen & Hoffman, supra note 16; Ramsey Touchberry, Trump’s ‘Retaliation’
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On April 7, 2020, President Trump displaced Glenn Fine from leadership of the
Department of Defense (DOD) IG’s office when he appointed the EPA IG to pull
double duty by serving as Acting DOD IG.198 The sudden acting appointment was
surprising for a number of reasons. First, Fine had celebrated experience as an IG,
including previous service as the DOJ IG, whereas the EPA IG was now tasked with
leading two IG offices, despite appointment as an IG only four months earlier.199
Second, CIGIE had recently designated Fine to lead the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established in the Coronavirus, Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act to provide oversight of the Act’s $2
trillion in emergency federal spending.200 Because the CARES Act required the head
of an IG office to hold the PRAC leadership position, Fine’s replacement meant that
he could no longer lead the committee.201
On April 30, 2020, President Trump nominated a new HHS IG, not long after
then Acting HHS IG Christi Grimm issued an April 3 report on hospital preparedness
to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.202 At the time, state and local governments
were criticizing the inadequacy of the federal government’s response to COVID-19,
pleading for the federal government to utilize its authority and resources to coordinate
a national response strategy, add hospital capacity, obtain and distribute supplies,
and expand testing, contact tracing, and other mitigation efforts.203 The HHS IG
report qualified that it was “not a review of HHS response to the COVID-19 pandemic,” but rather, sought to illuminate “hospitals’ challenges and needs,” and to
assist HHS with its response efforts.204 The report found a “severe” dearth of testing
supplies, identified “widespread” shortages of protective equipment for health workers,
and noted hospitals’ concerns about federal government assistance and guidance.205
Against Impeachment Witnesses Spurs Call to Investigate Amid Fierce Criticism, NEWSWEEK
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/trumps-retaliation-against-impeachment-witnes
ses-spurs-call-investigate-amid-fierce-criticism-1486552 [https://perma.cc/38UM-TXWK].
198
See Savage & Baker, supra note 19.
199
See id.; John M. Donnelly, Trump’s Pick for Pentagon Watchdog Prompts Questions,
ROLL CALL (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/20/trumps-pick-for-pentagon
-watchdog-prompts-questions/ [https://perma.cc/H29J-QXP4].
200
Press Release, CIGIE, Glenn A. Fine Appointed Chair of CIGIE’s Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (Mar. 30, 2020), https://ignet.gov/content/glenn-fine-appointed-chair-cig
ie%E2%80%99s-pandemic-response-accountability-committee [https://perma.cc/NXE5-58WK].
201
See Savage & Baker, supra note 19.
202
Rein, supra note 19.
203
See, e.g., Robert Costa & Aaron Gregg, Governors and Mayors in Growing Uproar
over Trump’s Lagging Coronavirus Response, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/governors-and-mayors-in-growing-uproar-over-trumps-lagging
-coronavirus-response/2020/03/22/98ac569a-6c49-11ea-a3ec-70d7479d83f0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/NR9H-G62S].
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HHS IG COVID-19 HOSPITALS REPORT, supra note 100, at 1.
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After release of the report, President Trump stated during a COVID-19 briefing that
the report was “wrong” and wrote on Twitter that it was “another Fake Dossier,” an
allusion comparing the HHS report to a compilation of allegations that were part of
the Russia Investigation.206
On May 15, 2020, President Trump notified Congress that he was terminating
State Department IG Steve Linick.207 Congress opened an inquiry into the matter
after reports, which the President confirmed, that Linick’s firing came at the request
of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.208 At the time, the State Department IG had
ongoing matters relating to the Secretary of State’s office, including an investigation
of Secretary Pompeo’s misuse of government resources and a review of an expedited $8 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia.209 As noted above, the State Department
IG had also previously reported on substantiated instances of personnel decisions
based on political factors in violation of civil service requirements.210
Finally, on May 16, 2020, President Trump replaced the Acting IG for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Mitchell Behm.211 Media reports indicate that the
DOT IG office was investigating whether DOT Secretary Elaine Chao, who is married
to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, exercised preferential treatment for
Kentucky by steering DOT funds to the state, possibly to help McConnell’s reelection in 2020.212
The Inspector General Act required that President Trump provide a statement
of reasons to Congress 30 days in advance of the Atkinson and Linick removals.213
As the notice procedure does not apply to acting IGs, he was not required to explain
the reasons for the replacements of Fine, Grimm, or Behm.214 In both letters to
Congress providing notice of the Atkinson and Linick removals, President Trump
used identical language, stating that “it is vital that I have the fullest confidence in
the appointees serving as Inspectors General,” and “[t]hat is no longer the case with
206

See Brett Samuels, Trump Decries IG Report on Hospital Shortages as ‘Another Fake
Dossier’, THE HILL (Apr. 7, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/491561-trump
-decries-ig-report-on-hospital-shortages-as-another-fake-dossier.
207
Letter from Donald Trump, President, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (May 15, 2020) [hereinafter Linick Notice of Removal Letter].
208
See Catie Edmondson & Michael D. Shear, Trump Ousted State Dept. Watchdog at
Pompeo’s Urging; Democrats Open Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/05/16/us/politics/linick-investigation-pompeo.html [https://perma.cc/A5KM
-NP7Z].
209
Transcript of Interview of Steven Linick, House of Representatives, Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, at 42–43, 56–58 (June 3, 2020), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/7/47
b1f13c-7b02-4b58-a32d-d4cb74ee9291/4260E22C7282CBACBC5D94AA72FAB265.linick
-final-redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DB5-YWCE].
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regard to this Inspector General.”215 In candid public comments, however, President
Trump elaborated on the terminations.216 The President claimed justification for the
termination of Atkinson because he had sent a “fake report” to Congress.217 As to
Linick, the President stated that Secretary Pompeo was “not happy with the job he’s
doing” and suggested that the misuse of funds investigation relating to Pompeo was
not “important.”218
Members of Congress challenged the President’s explanations for the IG removals.219 A bipartisan group of Senators, including Senator Chuck Grassley who has
long supported IGs, argued that the President’s termination notice was “not sufficient” under the Inspector General Act “because Congress intended that inspectors
general only be removed when there is clear evidence of wrongdoing or failure to
perform the duties of the office, and not for reasons unrelated to their performance,
to help preserve IG independence.”220 In response, the White House Counsel countered
that the President has broad removal power, questioned the constitutionality of the
notice requirement, and asserted that the President provided notice that was comparable to President Obama’s notice in the Walpin case.221 Senator Grassley demanded
further explanation of the reasons for both the Atkinson and Linick firings, and even
briefly held up two unrelated nominations before the Senate.222 After the White
House provided additional explanations, Senator Grassley relented on the nominations, while stating that he disagreed with the purported reasons for the removals.223
President Trump’s firings and replacements retaliated against IGs for the legitimate
exercise of their oversight responsibilities: appropriate communication of whistleblower allegations to Congress, reports of mismanagement and resource concerns
for response to the pandemic, and ongoing investigations of alleged misconduct by
215
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216
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217
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/21263508/trump-inspector-general-steve-linick-firing-mike-pompeo-investigation [https://
perma.cc/W2KL-V3EV].
219
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Id. at 2 (questioning both the sufficiency of the notice and the placement of Atkinson
on administrative leave during the 30-day notice period); see also Letter from Charles S.
Grassley, Senator, to Donald Trump, President (May 18, 2020) (seeking explanation as to
Linick’s termination).
221
Letter from Pat Cippolone, Counsel to the President, to Charles S. Grassley, Senator,
at 1–2 (May 26, 2020) [hereinafter Cippolone].
222
See Kevin Breuninger, GOP Senator Lifts Hold on Trump Nominees Despite Disagreeing
with Inspector General Firings, CNBC (June 19, 2020, 1:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2020/06/19/chuck-grassley-lifts-hold-he-placed-on-trump-nominees-over-ig-firings.html
[https://perma.cc/A4YL-RNQR].
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administration officials. These actions flouted norms strongly favoring retention of
IGs who legitimately perform their duties and served as a troubling warning to IGs
about the perils of independent oversight. Further, the inadequate explanations for
the removals revealed shortcomings in procedural notice requirements intended to
prevent arbitrary IG terminations. As discussed below, the removals and replacements also underscore independence concerns that arise in relation to the vacancies
created by such actions.
B. Presidential Misuse of Appointment Authority
1. Acting IG Appointments
Like the aforementioned removals and replacements, President Trump’s acting
IG appointments breached independence norms because President Trump did not
select senior staff within the relevant IG offices to serve as the acting IGs and, in
some cases, designated acting officials with conflicts of interest who appeared to
lack nonpartisan qualifications.224 The IG acting appointments also reflected broader
concerns that President Trump’s use of acting appointments sought to install loyalists
and forestall the Senate confirmation process for filling vacancies.225
The Inspector General Act does not specifically address acting appointments
during the pendency of IG vacancies.226 Rather, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act
of 1998 (FVRA) sets forth the mechanism for temporarily filling positions that
require presidential appointment with the Senate’s advice and consent.227 The FVRA
applies when an official previously confirmed by the Senate “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.”228 President Trump’s
removal of IGs raised several questions pertaining to this provision, including whether
placement on administrative leave or termination itself constitute an inability to
224
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Watchdogs at Large, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/watchdogs-at-large/ [https://perma.cc/73R6-SNY3]
(listing some of the selected acting IGs who were selected from outside of the relevant offices
of their appointment).
225
See Felicia Sonmez, Trump Says He’s ‘in No Hurry’ to Replace Acting Cabinet Members,
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says
-hes-in-no-hurry-to-replace-acting-cabinet-members/2019/01/06/afac5fea-11e4-11e9-b6ad
-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?utm_term=.fc627428ca1d [https://perma.cc/H2J6-4BJ3] (reporting that President Trump said he liked the “flexibility” of using “acting” officials to fill key
positions without Senate confirmation); Becca Damante, At Least 15 Trump Officials Do Not
Hold Their Positions Lawfully, JUST SEC. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org
/72456/at-least-15-trump-officials-do-not-hold-their-positions-lawfully/ [https://perma.cc
/HTM8-9LUG] (explaining that several acting appointments by President Trump violated the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act and circumvented the Senate confirmation process).
226
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1–13.
227
5 U.S.C. § 3347; 5 U.S.C. § 3345.
228
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perform the duties of the office, thereby triggering the FVRA’s procedures.229
Although the Inspector General Act requires the President to notify Congress “30
days before the removal,”230 the President placed Atkinson and Linick on administrative leave before the 30 days was up.231 Further, President Trump created the
vacancy by removing the IGs, so the inability of the removed IGs to perform their
duties was entirely a situation of the President’s making.232
The FVRA also addresses the categories of individuals who are permitted to
hold a position in an acting capacity and the time limits on such acting appointments.233 It provides that the “first assistant to the office” automatically becomes the
acting officer in the vacant position.234 As an alternative, the President is permitted
to designate another official confirmed by the Senate to serve in the acting role, or
another “officer or employee” of the same agency who served within the agency for
a minimum of 90 days in the prior year.235 When President Trump named a new
acting IG in the cases discussed below, he declined the default option of designating
the IG’s first assistant to serve in an acting capacity.236
At the time President Trump designated the EPA IG to serve as acting DOD IG,
he also nominated a candidate to become the permanent DOD IG, subject to the
Senate’s advice and consent.237 If President Trump had not designated the EPA IG
to become the acting DOD IG at the time of the nomination, Fine would have been
the acting IG until confirmation of a permanent replacement.238 In other cases,
229
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after the State IG’s dismissal in light of open FVRA questions as to whether administrative
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230
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231
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.com/federal-vacancies-reform-act-and-va-study-uncertainty-and-incompetence [https://
perma.cc/6W5C-9X6N] (describing the purpose of the FVRA as “giv[ing] the president flexibility to deal with unexpected vacancies, not to create vacancies himself and then sidestep
existing succession schemes”).
233
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Id. § 3345(a)(2–3). Although the law states that no acting officer may hold the vacant
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the pendency of the first and second nominations of an official for Senate confirmation. See
id. § 3346 (stating that a person may serve “no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the
vacancy occurs; or . . . once a first or second nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate,
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236
See O’Connell, supra note 224 (listing some of the selected acting IGs and their
previous positions).
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to serve in an acting capacity under the FVRA had expired).
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President Trump selected a political appointee over career officials in the IG’s office.239
For example, when President Trump fired the State Department IG, he designated
Stephen Akard, who held a political appointment as the Director of Foreign Missions, to the acting role.240 Similarly, when President Trump replaced Mitchell Behm
as Acting DOT IG, he named Skip Elliott, administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) which is an agency within DOT, to
serve as Acting DOT IG.241
The State Department and DOT acting IG appointments implicated conflict of
interest concerns because the new acting IGs had dual loyalties to policy responsibilities and oversight duties.242 As noted above, at the time of the acting appointments,
the State Department IG office and DOT IG office had ongoing investigations
relating to the department heads.243 Senator Grassley implored the President to avoid
“obvious conflicts” in acting appointments “that unduly threaten the statutorily
required independence of inspectors general.”244 The White House response did not
address the conflict of interest concerns, but rather, touted the compliance of the
acting appointments with the Vacancies Act and the qualifications of the new acting
IGs.245 Separate from the conflicts concerns, critics had questioned the acting
officials’ lack of relevant investigative or audit experience.246
And therein lies the problem. Nothing in the FVRA or the Inspector General Act
ultimately prevented President Trump from making acting appointments of individuals who had clear conflicts of interest and insufficient qualifications.
2. IG Permanent Appointments
President Trump’s nominations for vacant IG positions also presented concerns that
he sought loyalty in these appointees, rather than the requisite independence and
expertise.247
239
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Challenges filling vacancies with appropriate personnel are not unique to IGs.
The appointment process is designed, in principle, for the President to nominate
qualified individuals capable of responsibly carrying out the functions of high-level
positions, with the Senate exercising its advice and consent to ensure nominees have
the necessary skills, experience, and judgment to serve in the particular role.248
However, critiques of the appointments process cite a persistently high number of
vacancies due to delays and a multitude of unqualified nominees who do not serve
the public mission of agencies.249 IGs represent a specific case of the dual risks of
extended vacancies and unqualified nominees.
Republican and Democratic administrations alike have been responsible for
languishing IG vacancies, though the pace of nominations and appointments slowed
considerably under the Obama administration.250 In the period from 2007 to 2016,
the majority of IG positions had vacancies, and the appointment process to fill
vacancies ranged from less than a month to over five years.251 Concerns about IG
vacancies continued during the Trump administration. As of July 2020, thirteen IG
positions subject to presidential appointment remained vacant, with six pending
nominations.252 Several factors may explain the number and length of IG vacancies,
including the increasingly contentious and laborious nature of the appointments
process,253 qualifications requirements that may narrow the field of acceptable
candidates,254 and even the pay scale for IGs, which could dissuade qualified candidates.255 Long-standing vacancies deprive an IG office of permanent leadership with
[https://perma.cc/2KYT-52LY] (discussing Senators’ skepticism about the DOT IG nominee’s
stated commitment to independence after President Trump’ removals of IGs).
248
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the authority to establish priorities and the support for independence derived from
Senate confirmation.256
Permanent IG appointments warrant evaluation of a candidate’s capacity to perform
independent oversight that will inevitably involve some confrontation with agency
officials over investigative steps, findings, or recommendations that may uncover
wrongdoing or expose the administration to embarrassment, criticism, or further scrutiny.257 As noted above, the essential qualifications set forth in the Inspector General
Act are independence and relevant expertise.258 Administrations might nonetheless
seek to control oversight of their activities by appointing individuals to IG positions
based on expectations of political loyalty, rather than a commitment to independence.
President Trump’s post-removal nominations raised such concerns. For example,
he nominated Eric Soskin, a DOJ attorney, to become DOT IG.259 Democratic Senators questioned his ability to maintain independence in light of the IG removals and
the ongoing investigation of DOT Secretary Chao, Senator McConnell’s wife.260 President Trump also nominated Allen D’Souza, then an attorney with the National Security
Council, to become the IG for the intelligence community.261 D’Souza had previously
been minority staff director of the House Intelligence Committee and an aide to
Representative Devin Nunes.262 The irony of this nomination was unmistakable:
could be paid less than the Senior Executive Service (SES) staff in their offices who report
to them).
256
Compare Letter from CIGIE to Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate Majority Leader and
Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Democratic Leader, at 2 (November 7, 2016), https://www.ignet
.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE_Senate_Letter_IG_Vacancies_07Nov16%20(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/3D4J-9LKK] (“[N]o matter how able or experienced an acting Inspector
General may be, a permanent IG has the ability to exercise more authority in setting new
policies and procedures and, by virtue of the authority provided for in the IG Act, inevitably
will be seen as having greater independence.”), with GAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 251, at
28–41 (referencing the survey responses of acting IGs who reported that acting status did not
negatively impact their ability to fulfill IG duties).
257
Cf. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 178, at 1396 (referencing the relationship between
IGs and agencies as “often adversarial”).
258
5 U.S.C. 3(a) (requiring appointments “without regard to political affiliation and solely
on the basis of integrity,” and to and “demonstrated ability” in relevant fields); see also S.
REP. NO. 95-1071, at 25 (1978) (explaining that statutory qualifications sought to “safeguard
against the appointment of an Inspector and Auditor General that is motivated by any considerations other than merit”).
259
Wehrman, supra note 247.
260
See id. In December 2020, the Senate confirmed Soskin along partisan lines by a 48
to 47 vote. See Charlie Savage, Biden Faces Dilemma on What to Do With Watchdogs Appointed by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/politics
/biden-faces-dilemma-on-what-to-do-with-watchdogs-appointed-by-trump.html [https://perma
.cc/BD6S-7EZP] (noting tradition that most IGs were historically confirmed unanimously).
261
Julian E. Barnes, Trump Nominates Former Nunes Aide to Intelligence Watchdog Post,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/us/politics/intelligence
-community-inspector-general-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-ZNBC].
262
See id. The Senate did not act on the D’Souza nomination after the 2020 election. See
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President Trump selected a Nunes ally, who helped shape resistance to investigations of the President,263 to replace Atkinson, whose disclosure of the whistleblower
complaint to Congress gave rise to the first impeachment investigation concerning
Ukraine.264
In addition, following the IG removals, Congress created a Special Inspector
General for Pandemic Recovery to oversee the federal government’s emergency
pandemic spending programs.265 For this position, President Trump nominated Brian
Miller, who was confirmed largely along partisan lines.266 On the one hand, Miller
appeared to be a suitable candidate because he previously served for 10 years as an
IG for the General Services Administration.267 However, just prior to the Special IG
nomination, he was an Associate White House Counsel, advised President Trump
on responding to the first impeachment inquiry, and was involved in decisions to
withhold information during the investigation.268 The failure to provide information
during the investigation was part of the allegations for the obstruction of Congress
charge in the Articles of Impeachment against President Trump.269
III. REINFORCING INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE
The President’s use of the appointment and removal powers shapes the strength
of IG independence. President Trump’s removal of IGs subverted independence by
misusing the removal power to punish or prevent the legitimate performance of oversight responsibilities. His appointment of permanent or acting IGs with conflicts of
interest, political loyalties, or questionable qualifications created the reality or appearance of insufficient independence. Limitations on the President’s exercise of these
powers—both legal and normative—hold the potential to counter this abuse and prevent similar occurrences in the future. To reinforce IG independence, members of
Congress have offered several proposals to amend the laws relating to the removal
and appointment of IGs,270 and the House recently passed the Inspector General
also Congress.gov, PN2248—Allen Robert Souza—Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/2248 [https://perma.cc/B76J
-2M3F] (noting that D’Souza’s nomination was returned to the President).
263
See Barnes, supra note 261.
264
See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
265
See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116
-136, § 4018, 134 Stat. 482, 482–85 (2020).
266
See Courtney Buble, Senate Confirms Brian Miller to Be Pandemic Inspector General,
GOV’T EXEC. (June 2, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2020/06/senate-confirms
-brian-miller-be-pandemic-inspector-general/165842/ [https://perma.cc/QY7N-KZEQ].
267
Id.
268
See id.
269
See Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong.
(2019) (enacted).
270
See generally CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 9, at 1–3 (summarizing bills).
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Independence and Empowerment Act.271 This Part analyzes the constitutionality of
these proposals, examines policy application, and suggests several considerations for
lawmakers.
A. Inspector General Removal for Cause Protection
In response to President Trump’s IG terminations, members of the Senate and the
House offered several bills that would require cause to remove an IG.272 Historically,
Congress has enacted an array of similar for-cause removal provisions for members
of commissions273 and individual executive officers, including the Commissioner of
Social Security,274 the Special Counsel in the OSC,275 and the now-lapsed independent counsel.276 The United States Postal Service (USPS) IG is the one IG who already
has removal protection.277 However, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on the
removal power indicate that an IG removal for cause provision would be susceptible
to constitutional challenge.278
1. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of an IG removal for cause provision presents a specific
iteration of the larger debate between formalists and functionalists surrounding the
scope of executive and legislative powers. As previously discussed, formalists
emphasize political accountability as the foundation for a broad presidential removal
power, while functionalists focus on the countervailing value of good governance
to justify modest legislative limits on that power and secure independence.279 Indeed,
271

Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th Cong.
§ 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
272
See generally CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 9, at 1–2 (listing nine separate bills in 2020
containing various formulations of IG removal for cause protection, some with fixed terms).
273
See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2232–33 (2020)
(Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (noting for-cause protections for members of the Federal Reserve,
Federal Trade Commission, and other commissions).
274
42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (Commissioner “may be removed from office only pursuant to
a finding by the President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”).
275
5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (Special Counsel may be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.”).
276
28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (repealed) (no removal of the independent counsel except for
“good cause, physical or mental disability (if not prohibited by law protecting persons from
discrimination on the basis of such a disability), or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties”).
277
39 U.S.C. § 202(e)(3) (USPS IG “may at any time be removed only upon the written
concurrence of at least 7 Governors [on the USPS Board], but only for cause.”).
278
See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211; Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 513–14.
279
See supra Section I.C.1.
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this division was on display in the Seila Law and Free Enterprise Fund majority and
dissenting opinions, underscoring two different forms of accountability that modulate Justices’ divergent approaches to removal protection: democratic accountability,
which animates the formalist interest in presidential control, and good government
accountability, which supports some functional constraint on that control.280 Constitutional analysis of IG for-cause protection offers an opportunity to integrate an
understanding of the IG institution’s function as an internal constraint on power into
removal doctrine and to interpret its significance alongside concepts of presidential
accountability, executive control, and its reasonable limits.
The Seila Law majority’s framework would apply to IG removal protection. The
Court narrowed the grounds for removal protection by recasting Humphrey’s Executor
and Morrison as exceptions, but did not overrule these decisions.281 Removal
protection may be permissible “for multimember expert agencies that do not wield
substantial executive power” and “for inferior officers with limited duties and no
policymaking or administrative authority.”282 The Humphrey’s Executor exception
does not apply to the proposed IG removal protection because IGs are not members
of commissions.283 However, as officers who perform internal oversight functions
of audits and investigations, IGs may qualify for protection under Morrison based
on the nature of their office, duties, and powers.284
A closer look at Morrison is warranted. The independent counsel in Morrison
was an office designed for investigation and prosecution of high-ranking officials in
cases when the DOJ may have potential conflicts of interest. The Attorney General
could request that a special court appoint an independent counsel and, once appointed, the independent counsel had the power to investigate and prosecute particular
federal crimes.285 The law contemplated reporting by the independent counsel to
Congress and an end to the independent counsel’s tenure upon notice of the completion of investigations or prosecutions.286 In describing Morrison, the Seila Law
majority identified the contours of its stated exception:
Although the independent counsel was a single person and
performed “law enforcement functions that typically have been
280

Compare Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (articulating values of democratic accountability), with Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2231 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (articulating values of
good government accountability).
281
See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2206.
282
Id. at 2199–2200 (describing these grounds as “‘represent[ing] what up to now have been
the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s
removal power.’” (quoting PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Kavanaugh, J., dissenting))).
283
See id. at 2199.
284
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96.
285
See id. at 660–61.
286
See id. at 660–65.
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undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch,” we concluded that the removal protections did not unduly interfere with
the functioning of the Executive Branch because “the independent
counsel [was] an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause,
with limited jurisdiction and tenure and lacking policymaking or
significant administrative authority.”287
Accordingly, based on the Seila Law reading of permissible removal protection
under Morrison, this exception’s applicability turns on determinations that the role
qualifies as an “inferior officer” and has limited duties and authority.288
The term “inferior officers” appears in the Appointments Clause.289 Unlike
principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, Congress has the option to “vest” appointment authority for “inferior
officers” in “the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.”290 In Morrison, the Court found that the independent counsel was an inferior
officer, but observed that “[t]he line between inferior and principal officers is one
that is far from clear.”291 The Court has since made clear that the appointment method
is not determinative because presidential appointment with the Senate’s advice and
consent applies not only to principal officers, but also, is “the default manner of
appointment for inferior officers.”292
In Edmond v. United States, one year after the Morrison decision, the Court
linked the classification of inferior officers to their accountability to a higher-level
officer:
Generally speaking, the term “inferior officer” connotes a relationship with some higher-ranking officer or officers below the
President: Whether one is an “inferior” officer depends on
whether he has a superior. . . . [I]n the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important
Government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
287

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199.
See id.
289
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
290
See id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“Principal officers are selected
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow
to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary.”).
291
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72 (holding that the independent counsel, whose
appointment Congress had vested in a special court, was an inferior officer removable for
cause by the Attorney General).
292
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1989) (holding that Coast Guard
judges were inferior officers).
288
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level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination
with the advice and consent of the Senate.293
The reliance on accountability for inferior officer determinations reveals a synergy with
similar political accountability concerns in removal cases. This also suggests a mechanism for interpretation of IG removal for cause protection—removal limits may be permissible as long as the protected officer is accountable to a higher appointed officer.
In this light, IGs are inferior officers and satisfy the Morrison exception because
their oversight relies, in large part, on the President and agencies for ultimate accountability.294 Each IG has limited jurisdiction with respect to a particular department or agency.295 The Inspector General Act explicitly states that IGs do not have
policymaking authority296 and provides that IGs operate to some extent under the
“general supervision” of the agency head.297 To be sure, IGs have broad investigatory powers and authority to review matters without interference from agency
heads.298 However, while IGs report findings and make recommendations, these
reports are advisory; they lack independent enforcement authority to compel the
President or agencies to act on their findings or execute their recommendations.299
IGs thus have a degree of accountability to higher officers because they present
information for further action that the President or agency heads deem appropriate.
Functional assessment of the IG role as an internal constraint on the Executive
Branch demonstrates that removal is not the primary tool—much less a necessary
one—for response to IG oversight and vindication of presidential accountability.300 IGs
have significant responsibility based on their investigative duties and reporting obligations for transparency, but they cannot bind the Executive Branch to implement
293

Id. at 662–63.
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662–63.
295
See 5 U.S.C. § 6(e).
296
See id. at §§ 9(a), 8G(b) (stating that IGs do not have “program operating responsibilities”).
297
See id. at § 3(a); see also NASA v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229, 241 (1999) (“As far as the
[Inspector General Act] is concerned, NASA-OIG’s investigators are employed by, act on
behalf of, and operate for the benefit of NASA.”).
298
See id. at §§ 3(a), 6(a).
299
See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665 (“What is significant [for the inferior officer determination]
is that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a final decision on
behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers.”); accord
United States v. Arthrex Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2021) (explaining that “review by a superior executive officer” supported the inferior officer determination in Edmond).
300
Cf. Sitaraman, supra note 121, at 396 (arguing that “nothing but intuition” supports the
connection between removal and political control because while “‘fear’ and ‘threat[s]’ is one
approach to management[,] . . . it is not the only one”); Huq, supra note 121, at 33–34 (challenging the Court’s “binary” notion that presidential control turns on at-will removal authority exists,
and arguing that the multiplicity of control mechanisms across institutions warrants analysis).
294
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recommended reforms.301 The President and agencies hold the power to discipline
staff, to pursue remedies from contractors, or make policy changes based on IG reports.
This arrangement highlights the relevance of alternative control mechanisms when
evaluating whether at-will removal authority is truly a constitutional requirement for
accountability.302 The President and agency heads exercise control in response to IG
oversight through administrative, policy, and personnel decisions that represent
ultimate judgments of accountability.303 IG oversight facilitates the President’s faithful execution of the law in providing factual information about government operations for these judgments of accountability that remain within the discretion of the
President and agency heads. Accordingly, under the Seila Law framework, removal
protection for IGs is permissible.
The analysis has two important caveats, however. First, though IG removal
protection appears to comply with Seila Law, it may present a separate Free Enterprise Fund problem. Several IGs are assigned to oversee agencies, boards, or commissions where its head or members already have removal protection.304 Were
Congress to enact a blanket removal protection for all IGs, it would create dual forcause protection, which arguably runs afoul of Free Enterprise Fund.305 However,
“considerable uncertainty about the scope of its holding” remains.306 On the one
hand, the holding applied to PCAOB members who were “inferior officers” within
a dual for-cause structure.307 Justice Breyer’s dissent provided a list of hundreds of
inferior officers who also had removal protection within a dual for-cause structure
and, therefore, warned of the decision’s potentially far reaching implications.308 To
address this concern, Justice Roberts’s majority opinion suggested Free Enterprise
Fund was a narrow holding when he declared that “none of the positions [the
dissent] identifies are similarly situated to the Board.”309
301

See 5 U.S.C. § 2.
See Huq, supra note 121, at 26–32 (discussing a range of “alternative control mechanisms”
to removal and arguing that the “observed varieties of political control technologies” undermine the Court’s presupposed centrality of removal to presidential control).
303
See id.
304
See 12 U.S.C. § 242 (Federal Reserve); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (Consumer Product Safety
Commission); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (Federal Labor Relations Authority); 46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3)
(Federal Maritime Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (FTC); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (National Labor Relations Board); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 39 U.S.C. § 502(a)
(Postal Regulatory Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (Social Security Administration);
49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(3) (Surface Transportation Board).
305
See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (as noted
above, the USPS IG is the one IG who is already part of a dual structure under USPS governors
with good cause protection); see also 39 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)(1), (e)(3).
306
See id. at 536–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
307
See id. at 483–84.
308
See id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying forty-eight agencies, more than five
hundred SES officials, and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) with dual for-cause protection).
309
See id. at 506; see also Patricia Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal
302
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Though this declaration is difficult to square with the apparent breadth of majority’s reasoning elsewhere, the functional analysis of IG duties above supports the
distinction. Whereas the PCAOB can initiate disciplinary proceedings and issue
substantial monetary penalties,310 IGs report to higher level officials who have the
discretion to take further action, which may place IG removal protection on safer
ground within a dual for-cause structure. Congress has the option to test this approach by proceeding with the existing proposal that applies to all IGs or avoid any
potential problem by omission of removal protection for IGs who would otherwise
be within a dual structure. If the latter, most of this subset of IGs would retain the
existing procedural protection derived from the requirement that a majority of board
members or commissioners vote to remove the IG.311
Second, despite the arguments above, the Court’s recent wariness to extend
removal protection to “new situation[s]”312 suggests that it may decline application
of Morrison to IG removal protection based on distinctions between the independent
counsel and IGs. Unlike the independent counsel in Morrison, IGs do not have a
limited tenure, though Congress could address the issue by conjoining removal protection with a fixed term of office.313 In addition, the independent counsel’s jurisdiction
in Morrison required appointment by a special court upon request of the Attorney
General and ended upon completion of the underlying investigation or prosecution.314 In contrast, IGs retain ongoing authority to initiate review of agency matters
for fraud, waste, and abuse without need for a special request by another official.315
But these distinctions do not justify confinement of Morrison. IG powers of
review are “trained inward” toward government officials as was the case with the
independent counsel.316 Further, as argued above, the results of review are subject
Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2012) (explaining that “the Court sought to refocus
assessment of removal disputes” but “took pains to emphasize the narrowness of its holding—in
particular, that the holding carried no implications for the civil service or for ALJs”).
310
See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 485–86.
311
See 5 U.S.C. § 8G(e)(1) (two-thirds majority for board or commission to remove an
IG); 39 U.S.C. § 202(e) (seven of nine governors must concur to remove the USPS IG).
312
See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201 (2020).
313
Compare Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, S. 3664, 116th Cong. § 2(a–b)
(as introduced in S. Comm. On Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, May 7, 2020) (proposing a seven-year term of office), with Protecting Our Democracy Act of 2020, H.R. 8363,
116th Cong. §§ 702, 711 (as introduced in the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform in addition
to other committees, Sept. 23, 2020) (no fixed term). One potential concern is that fixed terms
may politicize the role if an IG seeks reappointment, though vetting for a renewed term would
likely consider the candidate’s reputation for independence. A term of office also offsets the
stronger removal protection by providing an opportunity at a fixed point in time to evaluate
work performance. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 67, at 791 (“[A] term of tenure ensures
that the Senate will have a chance to review an officer’s performance”).
314
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,661 (1988).
315
See 5 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2).
316
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661.
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to the discretion and control of other executive officials.317 The logic of Morrison,
when read alongside Edmond, applies to IGs because they are inferior officers with
limited powers reliant on higher-level officials to act on oversight. Fidelity to these
precedents warrants reading them to permit Congress to protect IGs from removal.
Nonetheless, the Court’s tone in recent cases suggests it is less inclined these
days to “toggle” between formalist rules of executive power and functional standards
of congressional limitation to suit the needs of independence than it has been in the
past.318 Consequently, in addition to consideration of the constitutional implications
of IG removal protection, Congress should also evaluate alternative structural arrangements that may incorporate removal protection and enhance IG independence.
These options include restructuring the IG institution as an (1) independent, multimember commission; (2) court-appointed officers; or (3) agency appointees. This
section will offer some general observations about these options.
An IG commission would have benefits from an institutional perspective in
coordinating the oversight activities of the IG community by leveraging existing
CIGIE structures. With commissioners appointed by the President to provide overall
direction for agency oversight, subordinate IGs could continue in their assignments
to specific agencies. However, such a commission would mean IGs no longer reside
within their agencies. Further, while at first glance the structure would appear to fit
under Humphrey’s Executor as a basis for removal protection, an IG commission
would present its own constitutional challenges.319 The Seila Law majority described
Humphrey’s Executor as “permit[ing] Congress to give for-cause removal protections
to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.”320
An IG commission would not provide a foundation for removal protection due to the
commission’s performance of executive investigative and audit functions.321
Another possible alternative would transform IGs into court-appointed officers
as in Morrison.322 As noted, the independent counsel provisions gave a special court,
upon application by the Attorney General, the authority to appoint the counsel and gave
the President, through the Attorney General, the authority to remove for cause.323
317

See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1989).
See Aziz Huq & Jon Michaels, The Cycles of Separation of Powers Jurisprudence, 126
YALE L.J. 346, 349 (2016) (explaining that the Court employed an “open textured standard”
in Morrison, versus a “hard-edged rule” in Free Enterprise Fund).
319
See Shugerman, supra note 148 (suggesting a commission structure for IGs as a mechanism to “take presidents and precedents seriously, and . . . value the historical evolution of
independence within the executive branch”).
320
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199 (2020).
321
See id. at 2200 n.4 (rejecting the dissent’s “imagined Humphrey’s-through-Morrison
framework” for applying removal limits to executive officers with significant rule-making,
enforcement, and adjudicatory powers).
322
See Huq, supra note 10 (suggesting IG appointment by the courts as a response to Seila
Law).
323
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663.
318
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The delegation of IG appointments to a court would bring IGs in closer proximity
to the independent counsel structure in Morrison.324 However, as discussed above,
the appointment structure does not dictate the constitutional availability of removal
protection.325 Moreover, this interbranch appointment method is better aligned with
a counsel who will make charging decisions and may litigate in court than with IGs
who hold nonlitigating, oversight positions.
A final option involves vesting agency heads with sole appointment authority
for all IGs. This is a familiar structure in that agency heads already appoint roughly
half of IGs, without the need for any Senate approval, and have removal authority.
Congressional intent to vest agency heads with appointment authority may also offer
some additional support to a constitutional determination that IGs are inferior
officers.326 However, one advantage of presidential nomination of IGs is the separation of agency heads from the selection of the IGs who will monitor their agency,
which could risk compromising independence.
These new structures are reasonable, albeit imperfect options for Congress to
consider in response to presidential abuse and the Court’s departure from the longstanding constitutional principle identified by the Seila Law dissent—“Congress
could protect from at-will removal the officials it deemed to need some independence
from political pressure,” as long as limits did not impede the President’s execution
of duties.327 However, because these options present their own constitutional or
policy challenges, the advisable course for Congress to enhance independence is an
amendment providing removal for cause protection, along with a fixed term of
office, and consideration of a possible Free Enterprise Fund carve out to avoid dual
for-cause structures.
2. Policy Application
In addition to its constitutionality, it is important to examine the policy implications of an IG removal for cause proposal—both whether the proposed law provides
IGs with adequate protection against removal for legitimate performance of their
oversight duties and articulates an administrable standard that sets forth acceptable
reasons for termination with a reasonable degree of clarity.
Removal for cause protections seek to secure independence from presidential
or agency head interference by minimizing the threat of arbitrary terminations.328
324

See Huq, supra note 10.
See supra Section II.A. See supra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
326
See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (“We have no doubt that when
Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it
may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest.”); see
also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n.27 (citing Perkins approvingly).
327
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2233 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
328
See Barkow, supra note 68, at 30 (“A removal restriction undoubtedly gives an agency
head greater confidence to challenge presidential pressure.”).
325
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They specify permissible reasons for a removal action and prohibit terminations that
lack proper justification.329 But the meaning of statutory good cause protections
remains unclear because the Court has not decided a case interpreting the meaning,330
though it has occasionally offered passing comments on the scope of protection.331
Recently, in Seila Law, the Court declined the invitation to engage in constitutional
avoidance by construing the CFPB director’s removal for cause provision “to reserve substantial discretion to the President,” stating that the argument had not
offered “any workable standard derived from the statutory language.”332 This underscores the importance of testing the practical application of the IG removal for cause
proposal in real and potential cases—a workable statutory standard may factor into
the constitutional analysis.
The Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act bars IG removal
unless the action satisfies one of several specified reasons:
(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
(B) Documented neglect of duty.
(C) Documented malfeasance.
(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.
(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or regulation.
(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
(H) Documented abuse of authority.
(I) Documented inefficiency.333
329

Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does
it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9–10 (2002) (describing the operation of good cause requirements as to private employees).
330
See Datla & Revesz, supra note 67, at 787 (explaining that “[t]he exact meaning of forcause protection clauses is uncertain” because “the Supreme Court has not decided a case
defining th[e] terms”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 110 (noting that “the Court has
not said what ‘good cause’ means,” and “also failed to define ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office’—the ordinary standards for presidential removal”).
331
See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Company Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 503
(2010) (describing the “unusually high standard” for removal of PCAOB members requiring
“willful” violations of securities law, abuse of authority, or “unreasonable failure to enforce
compliance”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (without deciding the scope of “good cause”
protection, suggesting that misconduct would be a permissible basis to remove the independent counsel); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 715, 729 (1986) (describing the terms
of a for-cause removal provision as “very broad” and allowing removal “for any number actual
or perceived transgressions”).
332
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2206 (considering the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, and
malfeasance in office” provision for the CFPB director).
333
See Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
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This language offers a broader set of reasons for removal than numerous existing
removal for cause statutes,334 as well as other recent bills containing IG removal for
cause protection.335 The provision also requires that reasons be “documented” in the
requisite notice to Congress.336 The documentation requirement in the IG removal
for cause proposal shares an interest in justification with a separate proposal before
the Senate that seeks to enhance the procedural notice requirements for removal.337
However, enhanced notice, which responds to President Trump’s inadequate explanations when he fired IGs, does not provide a substantive standard to evaluate the
propriety of removals. Conversely, the IG removal for cause proposal imposes both
substantive and procedural requirements.
As a response to President Trump’s removal of IGs, the proposed law offers IGs
protection from future retaliatory terminations for their legitimate performance of
oversight responsibilities. Had IG removal for cause protection existed at the time,
the President’s terminations of Atkinson and Linick would have violated the law.
In Atkinson’s case, post hoc explanations by the White House and Attorney General
contend that Atkinson erred in his judgment that the anonymous whistleblower reported an “urgent concern” requiring disclosure to Congress.338 However, Atkinson
followed the law by initially reporting his determination to the Director of National
Intelligence and, when they disagreed about reporting to Congress, notifying Congress about the disagreement; the Director, not Atkinson, ultimately shared the letter
with Congress.339 Atkinson’s compliance with requirements for handling the Ukraine
334

See Datla & Revesz, supra note 67, at 787 (generally describing “inefficiency, neglect
of duty, and malfeasance” as the typical grounds for removal in for-cause statutes).
335
See Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, S. 3664, 116th Cong. § 2(a–b) (as
introduced in S. Comm. On Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, May 7, 2020)
(proposing fewer grounds for removal); Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, H.R.
6668, 116th Cong. § 2(a–b) (as introduced in H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, May 1,
2020) (same).
336
Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
337
See Securing Inspector General Independence Act, S. 587, 117th Cong. § 2(a) (as
introduced by S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Mar. 4, 2021) (proposed requirement that the President’s notice include the “substantive rationale, including
detailed and case-specific reasons” for IG termination).
338
See Letter from Senators Dianne Feinstein and Mark Warner to Jeffrey Ragsdale, Office
of Professional Responsibility, and Michael Horowitz, DOJ IG (Apr. 17, 2020) [hereinafter
Letter from Feinstein & Warner] (discussing these explanations).
339
See 50 U.S.C. § 3033 (k)(3)(A)(i) (stating that the intelligence community IG “shall
immediately notify, and submit a report to, the congressional intelligence committees on
[any] matter” where the IG is unable to resolve disagreement about execution of IG duties
with the Director); see also Letter from Feinstein & Warner, supra note 338. Congress has
also introduced legislation that would eliminate the requirement that the intelligence community
IG first bring an “urgent concern” to the Director of National Intelligence before reporting to
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whistleblower complaint defeats any suggestion that his lawful disclosures would
have satisfied one of the removal grounds under the proposed law.
In Linick’s case, Secretary Pompeo’s purported reason for termination was
alleged IG office leaks to the media about a draft version of the report on politicized
personnel actions at the State Department, but his advisor conceded that Linick was
not personally responsible for the purported leaks.340 After Linick’s termination, the
matter was referred to CIGIE’s Integrity Committee for review, which determined
that Linick not only did not disclose information about the draft report to the media,
but had requested that a separate IG office investigate the allegation.341 While the
demonstration of improper disclosures about an ongoing investigation could qualify
as an abuse of authority or violation of law in other circumstances, these grounds did
not apply to Linick.342 The absence of evidence strongly suggests that the proffered
reason sought to manufacture a basis for termination of an IG whose office had
previously reported politicized personnel decisions and been actively investigating
matters relating to the Secretary.
These cases demonstrate that an IG removal for cause provision would prohibit
retaliatory terminations for legitimate oversight decisions, including the initiation
of particular investigations, lawful disclosures, or reports of findings and recommendations. The challenge for policymakers is designing a law that also addresses
scenarios beyond the politically motivated removals that gave rise to the proposal
in the first place, including circumstances when the President or agency head should
retain some discretion to remove an IG, such as substantiated instances of sufficiently serious misconduct, abuse of authority, mismanagement, or lack of integrity
that may compromise IG independence.
The proposed law sets forth grounds for removal that appear to cover these
circumstances.343 Consider its application to past conduct by IGs:
Congress and expand matters that constitute an “urgent concern.” See Protecting Our Democracy
Act of 2020, H.R. 8363, 116th Cong. § 712 (as introduced in the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Reform in addition to other committees, Sept. 23, 2020).
340
Chris Cillizza, Mike Pompeo’s Explanation for the Firing of State’s Inspector General
Doesn’t Make Sense, CNN (May 19, 2020, 11:57 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/19/poli
tics/mike-pompeo-steve-linick-state-department/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZDU2-HDW6].
341
See Letter from Kevin H. Winters, Chairperson of the CIGIE Integrity Committee and
Deborah J. Jeffrey, Vice Chairperson of the CIGIE Integrity Committee, to Michael E.
Horowitz, Chairperson of CIGIE, and Allison C. Lerner, Vice Chairperson of CIGIE, at 1–2
(Dec. 29, 2020).
342
See id. (finding “no reasonable basis to believe that IG Linick abused his authority in
the exercise of official duties or while acting under color of office, or otherwise engaged in
substantial misconduct, such as gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, or a substantial
violation of law, rule, or regulation, or conduct that undermines the independence or integrity
reasonably expected of an Inspector General”).
343
See Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
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A report determined that former FHFA IG Laura Wertheimer created
“a culture of witness intimidation” by “ridiculing, belittling, and bullying her staff” for making lawful disclosures and obstructed the Integrity
Committee investigation by withholding requested information.344
Former State Department IG Howard Krongard was alleged to have,
among other things, interfered with a labor trafficking investigation of
a construction contractor working on the Iraq embassy and an arms
smuggling investigation concerning a private security company where
his brother was a board member.345
A report found several actions by former NASA IG Robert Cobb
created the appearance of a lack of independence, including decisions
not to report a computer intrusion to the State Department after NASA
failed to do so or to allow a public notice seeking information about the
theft of a ring from the remains of a deceased Astronaut in the 2003
Columbia Space Shuttle explosion.346
Another report determined that the former Department of Commerce IG
Johnnie Frazier demoted two employees after they made complaints
about his inappropriate travel expenditures.347
Additional reports have found instances where IGs failed to disclose
spousal employment in an agency unit that had been audited by the
office or made improper discriminatory comments in the workplace.348

Each of these cases appear to meet the definition of removable offenses under
the proposed law. In Wertheimer’s case, the report concluded that she “abused her
authority” by engaging in the mistreatment of staff and witnesses in connection with
344

See Letter from Kevin H. Winters, Chairperson of the CIGIE Integrity Committee, to
President Joseph R. Biden, at 4 (Apr. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Winters]; see also Rachel Siegel,
Inspector General Overseeing Federal Housing Agency Resigns, Months After Watchdog
Report Finds Abuse of Authority, WASH. POST (June 30, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/us-policy/2021/06/30/fhfa-inspector-general-resigns-laura-wertheimer/ [https://
perma.cc/X5GJ-YPHJ] (reporting on the FHFA IG’s resignation).
345
See Assessing the State Department Inspector General: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1–4 (2007) (statement of Representative
Henry A. Waxman, Chair) (describing complaints by senior IG officials that Krongard prevented a meaningful investigation of the embassy project, refused to cooperate with DOJ, and
disclosed the existence of the security contractor investigation without DOJ’s permission).
346
Letter from James H. Burrus, Jr., Chair of the Integrity Committee, to Clay Johnson,
III, Chairman, President’s & Executive Councils on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 7, 2007)
(reporting on these issues, as well as the IG’s creation of an abusive work environment).
347
H.R. REP. 110-354, at 12 (2007) (discussing the OSC report and noting the IG’s retirement following its issuance).
348
See Integrity Committee, Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report to Congress and the President,
at 3–4 (2014), available at https://www.oversight.gov/report/cigie/cigie-integrity-committee
-fiscal-year-2014-annual-report [https://perma.cc/UTZ4-CLFF].
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the investigation,349 which shows an express finding that would satisfy the abuse of
authority ground for removal under the proposed law.350 Krongard and Cobb would
likely have been subject to removal for abuse of authority, neglect of duty, or inefficiency because the evidence in their cases, which included statements of officials
in their IG offices, showed that they took steps contrary to accepted investigative
standards and acted with insufficient independence.351 Frazier would also have been
subject to removal for a violation of law, malfeasance, or, possibly, a gross waste
of funds for his proven retaliation against staff and inappropriate travel expenses.352
In addition, the multiple grounds for removal cover a range of activities that qualify
as potentially removable offenses, including the failure to disclose conflicts of
interest and the creation of a discriminatory or hostile work environment.353
That the proposal requires “documented” grounds for removal responds to
critiques that it lacks a workable standard.354 This documentation requirement contemplates some investigation that develops evidence for or against the legal conclusion
that one of the specified grounds for removal exist. CIGIE’s Integrity Committee
(IC) is an existing system for investigation and substantiation of IG misconduct.355
It reviews allegations that “involve abuse of authority in the exercise of official
duties or while acting under color of office, substantial misconduct, such as gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, or a substantial violation of law, rule, or regulation, or conduct that undermines the independence or integrity reasonably expected
of” an IG.356 When an investigation substantiates one of these allegations, the IC
refers the findings to, among others, the appointing authority and may include
recommendations for disciplinary action.357
The IC system demonstrates that the meaning of law can be given further
specificity through the fact-based determinations of investigation. IC determinations
offer an independent basis for documenting and taking any adverse actions. Except
in egregious cases, the President and agency heads should consider refraining from
removal until the IC has investigated the underlying reasons.358 Legislators may also
349

Winters, supra note 344, at 28.
Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 102 (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021).
351
Id.
352
Id.
353
Id.
354
See id.
355
See 5 U.S.C. § 11(d)(1) (The Integrity Committee is composed of four IGs, an FBI representative, and the OGE Director or designee).
356
CIGIE, INTEGRITY COMMITTEE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 2018 6 (2018), available
at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Integrity_Committee_Policies_andProcedures
_Revised_Jan-2018_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK75-KUL8].
357
Id. at 11–12.
358
See Metzger, supra note 11, at 433 (noting that the President may voluntarily impose
internal constraints or procedures); see also CORE Act, H.R. 7076, 116th Cong. § 8(b) (as
350
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look to revise the for-cause proposal by explicitly including IC determinations as an
additional ground for removal: specifically, documented misconduct substantiated
by the IC, where it has recommended removal as a possible disciplinary action.359
In sum, the proposed IG law would provide protection against retaliatory terminations for an IG’s legitimate performance of oversight responsibilities. It also
retains a broad set of grounds when exercise of the removal power is permissible.
In such cases, whether to remove an IG turns on normative considerations, rather
than law, but requires factual support for dismissal. A removal for cause statute can
protect IG independence and, when appropriate, permit accountability.
B. Inspector General Appointment Qualifications and Restrictions
Congress is also considering reforms related to appointments of permanent and
acting IGs.360 While the IG removal for cause proposal proceeds against the backdrop of recent disputes before the Court over the constitutionality of removal
protections, the proposed IG appointment reforms stand on firm constitutional
ground. They also respond to several of the appointment threats discussed earlier.
Bills before Congress confront the fact that no law restricted President Trump’s
designation of acting IGs with conflicts of interest and inadequate qualifications.361
These designations of political appointees from outside IG offices were especially
problematic because the appointees were then charged with leading oversight
investigations of the agency heads to whom they reported in their political roles.362
The bills create a presumption that “the first assistant” to a departing IG would assume the acting role and, if unavailable, require designation of senior officials from
within the IG community.363 This change, therefore, bars the selection of political
appointees from outside IG offices for acting positions, as occurred with President
Trump’s acting appointments at the State Department and DOT IGs.364
introduced in the House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, June 1, 2020) (would require IC
investigations of IG removals).
359
See Winters, supra note 344, at 29 (recommending “consideration of substantial disciplinary action, up to and including removal” for the former FHFA IG).
360
See generally CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 9, at 1–3.
361
See Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 301(a) (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021); Securing Inspector General Independence Act, S. 587, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (as introduced by S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, Mar. 4, 2021).
362
See supra Section II.B.1.
363
See Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021, H.R. 2662, 117th
Cong. § 301(a) (as passed by the House, June 29, 2021); Securing Inspector General Independence Act, S. 587, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (as introduced by S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, Mar. 4, 2021).
364
See id.
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Congress derives constitutional authority for these limits from the Appointments
Clause.365 The text requires the President to have Senate consent to appoint principal
officers and permits Congress to “vest” appointment authority in the President for inferior officers.366 Presidential acting appointments are thus contingent on congressional authorization and subject to legislative restriction.367 History further demonstrates
Congress’s constitutional role in determining the scope of the President’s authority
to temporarily fill vacant offices. The purpose of the FVRA, for example, was to set
stricter limits on presidential acting appointments after “various administrations’
noncompliance with the Vacancies Act.”368 Both text and history then support
Congress in the establishment of a default rule that the first assistant becomes acting
IG when a vacancy arises, with a presidential choice from among senior personnel
in IG offices only if the first assistant is unavailable.369
Congress can use its power over temporary appointment procedures to deter
arbitrary removals and promote filling vacancies. Though the restrictions not only prevent future temporary appointees with conflicts or insufficient qualifications, they
also indirectly alter the calculus of politically motivated IG terminations. With
knowledge that a termination would automatically place an IG’s first assistant into the
acting role, a President or agency head may be less inclined to pursue the termination
when the replacement would be little different in orientation to the role from the predecessor.370 The first assistant’s succession to the acting position likely means the
designation of a person who will continue pursuit of ongoing investigations, satisfy
the requisite qualifications for the office, and exercise impartial oversight. Further,
365

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. (providing that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating
that Congress “may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Head of Departments”).
367
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Office of Legal Counsel Opinion, Authority of the President to Remove the Staff Director of the Civil Rights Commission and Appoint an Acting
Staff Director, at 104–05 (Mar. 30, 2001) (stating that the President has authority to make
temporary appointments subject to “congressional prohibition” (quotation marks omitted)).
368
S. REP. 105-250, at 8 (1998).
369
See Goldsmith, supra note 10 (explaining the constitutionality of restrictions on presidential acting IG appointments). Because, as discussed above, IGs are inferior officers,
possible objections to acting appointees serving as principal officers do not apply here. See
NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 929, 947–49 (2016) (Thomas, J. concurring) (opining that
the FVRA may violate the Appointments Clause where an inferior officer was designated to
temporarily fill a principal office); E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office
Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 214–19 (2018) (offering a “special-and-temporary-office
theory” for the constitutionality of acting appointments).
370
Cf. Ben Miller Gootnick, Note, Boundaries of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 56
HARV. L. REV. 459, 490 (2019) (recommending amendment of the FVRA to require the first
assistant become acting in the event of a firing, because “[i]t recognizes the unique constitutional concerns removal presents, and the heightened interest the Senate retains in protecting
its advice and consent role when an officer is fired”).
366
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strict limits on acting IG appointments may encourage the nomination of candidates
for permanent IG positions.
Additional bills offer modest changes to facilitate filling long-standing IG vacancies. One bill passed in the House would require the President to produce a written
explanation to Congress if no one has been nominated to a vacant IG position within
210 days of the vacancy,371 while another bill would allow a panel of three IGs designated by the CIGIE chair to appoint a temporary IG after the 210-day period.372 These
proposals should be considered in conjunction with renewed attention to the statutory
qualifications of permanent IGs and the procedure for appointments. After the removal
and replacement of IGs, President Trump nominated candidates with partisan backgrounds, including recent White House or legislative experience, that called into
question their ability to exercise the necessary independence for IG oversight.373
As the Court acknowledged in Myers, Congress has the power “to prescribe
qualifications for office” as long as “the[se] qualifications do not so limit selection
and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”374 In
his Myers dissent, Justice Brandeis elaborated that “a multitude of laws have been
enacted which limit the President’s power to make nominations,” including particular types of experience.375 Congress exercised this authority with respect to IG
appointment by requiring that the President and agency heads appoint IGs “without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations.”376 However, the generality of the qualification
criteria is arguably too malleable to ensure nomination and appointment of individuals with the necessary independence or experience.
More stringent requirements, including a specified a number of years in a management or enforcement role with an IG office, prosecutor, or audit organization
may better target candidates with suitable law enforcement, investigations, or audit
experience than the “demonstrated ability” qualification in current law. Objective
requirements, rather than amorphous categories such as “public administration”
experience, are more likely to reduce risks of politicized or unqualified appointments
371

Inspector General Protection Act, H.R. 23, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (as passed by the House
Jan. 5, 2021).
372
CORE Act, H.R. 7076, 116th Cong. § 8(d) (as introduced in the House Comm. on
Oversight and Reform, June 1, 2020).
373
See supra Section II.B.2.
374
Myers v. United States, 47 S. Ct. 21, 29 (1926).
375
Id. at 265 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Compare West, supra note 369, at 201–05 (arguing
that Congress’s authority to create offices “by Law” entail the power to impose qualifications),
with Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for
Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 746–47 (2008) (arguing that the Appointments
Clause bars qualifications for principal officers and permits them for inferior officers).
376
5 U.S.C. § 3(a).
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for IG positions.377 In addition, Congress should consider requiring that the President
and agency heads select IGs from lists of qualified candidates.378 CIGIE is already
required to recommend qualified candidates for IG nominations,379 but the appointing authority is not required to select from such recommendations. Mandatory
selection from CIGIE lists could screen out partisan or unqualified choices. Additional
requirements would arguably exacerbate the length of vacancies by narrowing the field
of eligible candidates. However, CIGIE offers a reliable mechanism for identifying
candidates with sufficient qualifications and commitment to independence. The Senate,
too, can insist upon confirmation of candidates who demonstrate this commitment.
CONCLUSION
Attacks on the rule of law and democratic norms during the Trump administration
have properly focused public attention on assessment of the damage to institutions
and safeguards for the future. Oversight independence enabled IGs to operate as a
check on the Executive Branch by conducting reviews that uncovered wrongdoing and
failures, but also, exposed them to retaliatory abuse. Codification of well-established
norms into law, such as removal protection and appointment restrictions, is one path
to reinforcement of oversight independence. The structure of the IG institution as
an internal constraint on the Executive Branch is constitutionally relevant to separation of powers challenges to independence protections. As explained, removal
protection is permissible because IG reports of deficiencies and recommendations
for reform are presented to the President and agencies for their ultimate decisions
about action and accountability. In other words, the good government accountability
supplied by IGs depends, in significant part, on presidential accountability.
However, the duties and powers that qualify the IG institution for independence
protections—the lack of direct enforcement power and reliance on others in the
Executive Branch for accountability—also may inhibit its effectiveness. IGs performed an array of critical oversight functions during the Trump administration. Yet
further inquiry of IG effectiveness is necessary to evaluate whether the hostility and
377

Cf. Rebecca Jones, Inspectors General Wanted: Swamp Creatures Need Not Apply,
PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Jun. 2, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020
/06/inspectors-general-wanted-swamp-creatures-need-not-apply/ [https://perma.cc/DZ2E
-A294] (noting that some of President Trump’s nominees for permanent IG appointments
were “alarmingly unqualified” and did not satisfy expectations for the position).
378
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding the statutory requirement that the President select three judges for U.S. Sentencing Commission from a list of six
judges compiled by Judicial Conference of the United States); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
728–29 (1986) (noting the Comptroller General is selected by the President from a list of
three candidates provided by House Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate).
379
5 U.S.C. 11(c)(1)(F).
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resistance to oversight during this period may have frustrated the ability of IGs to serve
as a meaningful constraint on executive power and mechanism of accountability.380
The law of oversight independence provides safeguards against presidential
abuses of power. Deeper normative commitments to oversight accountability are
required to reinforce the values and practices of good government.

380

Cf. Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1031 (analyzing effectiveness of IG national security
reviews during the George W. Bush administration).

